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A Right Without a Potent Remedy:
Indiana's Bad Faith Insurance Doctrine
Leaves Injured Third Parties Without Full
Redress
GREGORY A. BULLMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance companies in the United States operate underheavy state regulation,' but
state regulation of the insurance industry as a whole does not completely protect the
average insurance policyholder.2 The primary vehicle for policyholders to protect
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editors for their help in revising this Note. Finally, I thank my family and Christine Popp for
their love and support.
I. All fifty states have an insurance department designed to regulate the insurance
industry. Ralph Nader, Foreword to WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF, How TO MAKE INSURANCE
COMPANIES PAY YOUR CLAIMS & WHAT TO Do EF THEY DON'T, at vii (1990). See generally
KATHLEEN HEALD ETTLINGER ET AL., STATE INSURANCE REGULATION 79-103 (1 st ed. 1995).
2. See WILLIAM M. SHERNOFF, PAYMENT REFUSED 14-16 (1986); see also Nader, supra
note 1, at vii-ix. Ralph Nader, in his typical style, describes state regulation of the insurance
industry as a "farce." Nader, supra note 1, at vii. Nader explains that a policyholder who has
been angered by the bad faith tactics of her insurer may "seek redress from the state insurance
commissioner, but... this is rarely effective." Id. at ix. According to Nader, state insurance
commissioners fail to protect policyholders because the commissioners are too closely aligned
with the insurance companies and their "lobbying muscle" to "concern themselves with the
rights of the consumers." Id. at viii.
For a discussion of the inability of Indiana's Department of Insurance to protect Indiana
policyholders, see Scott J. Paltrow, A Matter of Policy: How a State Becomes Popular With
Insurers But Not Consumers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1998, at Al. The Indiana Department of
Insurance
has a hard time regulating the more than 1,800 insurance companies it licenses.
[Its] tiny budget, along with laws limiting the department's enforcement powers
and a generally warm relationship between the state Legislature and the insurance
industry, have combined to give Indiana one of the least-effective insurance
departments in the nation.
... [T]his helps explain why insurance companies are flocking to Indiana. In
1994, consulting firm Conning & Co. surveyed insurance companies to find out
which of the 50 states they believed provided the most insurer-friendly regulatory
environment. Insurers ranked Indiana second, after Illinois, for insurance sold to
individuals, and first for commercial insurance.
Since 1994, the number ofcompanies licensed to sell insurance in the state has
risen eight percent, to 1,828, while the number of insurers with headquarters in the
state has grown nearly thirteen percent, to 206. "Indiana has been a wonderful
state for insurance companies to do business in," says Mr. [Stephen A.] Williams,
[an] insurance lobbyist.
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
themselves from an insurance company that settles its policyholders' claims in bad
faith is not through state regulation, but through private regulation (that is, through
civil litigation).' Therefore, in order to check the conduct of powerful insurance
companies, their clients-the policyholders-need litigation rights with real teeth.'
The insurance industry has grown so powerful that it has been dubbed "the biggest
game in the world."5 As the industry expands, insurance companies develop different
3. See ETTLINGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 103-04; see also Nader, supra note 1, at vii-ix;
SHERNOFF, supra note 2, at 14-16. State insurance departments purposely do not attempt to
handle the claims of every policyholder. ETTLINGER ET AL, supra note l, at 103. When a
dispute arises between a policyholder and an insurer, the dispute will likely be resolved through
private regulation rather than through state regulation. Id. "Private regulation" includes
lawsuits, arbitration, and appraisal. Id. at 104. Civil litigation, rather than state regulation,
holds so much more importance for the needs of the average insurance policyholder that even
"[m]any [insurance companies'] claims people consider private regulation to be the primary
method to assure that claims activities are monitored and that consumers are treated in good
faith." Id. at 103.
4. Enhanced private litigation rights are responsible for some of the improvements that
insurance companies have made in their claims practices to date. ANDREW TOBIAS, THE
INVIsIBLE BANKERS: EVERYTHING THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY NEVER WANTED You TO KNOW
121 (1982). The insurance industry, however, is similar to a self-contained ecosystem: one
element cannot change without affecting other elements in the system. Therefore, when one
policyholder wins a large damage award through litigation, the price of insurance will increase
for all policyholders (as insurance companies charge higher premiums to cover their legal
losses). See SPENCERL. KIMBALL, INsURANcELAw4 (1992); see also PATMAGARICK, ExcESs
LIABILrTY: THE LAW OF EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF INSURERS § 19.01, at 19-5 (3d ed.
1998); TOBIAS, supra, at 121.
It is clear that enhanced private litigation rights "will either lead to improved claims-
handling practices .... or else to higher insurance rates" for all consumers, "or (most likely)
to some combination ofboth." TOBIAS, supra, at 121, Opponents of enhanced rights for higher
private litigants often argue that punitive damages lawsuits against insurers actually harm,
rather than help, the average consumer. Id. However,
[e]ven some insurance men disagree with that view. "There's no doubt that the
fact that some large punitive damages have been awarded has caused men in my
profession to be doubly sure that we're right," [The] Travelers [Corporation]
senior vice president Ray Stahl told the Los Angeles Times. "When these cases
[with high jury verdicts] started, we reviewed how we do things, how claims are
to be investigated, what action to take for a doubtful case, how to decline a claim.
If you proceed professionally there should be no grounds for a suit." Nor does he
think this need be more expensive. "If you do things right the first time round,"
he says, "it saves time and energy."
Id.
5. TOBIAS, supra note 4, at 11. Tobias's groundbreaking book on the underestimated
importance of the insurance industry describes the vast wealth held by insurance companies.
See id. at 11-25. Tobias pointed out that, as of 1982, the insurance industry employed many
more people than the United States Postal Service or the Internal Revenue Service, id. at 11-12,
the assets of the United States's insurance companies "were greater than the combined
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strategies to acquire a niche in the insurance marketplace.6 Some insurance companies
stress agreeable relations with their policyholders.' These companies pay a large
percentage of their policyholders' claims without unreasonable dispute in hopes of
profiting from their company's reputation for customer satisfaction.8 Other companies
try to make money by routinely refusing to honor their policyholders' claims in hopes
of cutting costs and improving overall profits.9 These companies refuse claims in
hopes that their policyholders will not or cannot pursue litigation; and, if litigation
occurs, these companies believe that the money they save by denying large numbers
of claims will exceed any money they lose to litigation costs."0
worldwide assets of the nation's fifty largest industrial corporations," id. at 14, only banks held
a greater share of wealth in America than insurance companies, id., the insurance industry
employed more people than the banking industry, id. at 16, and, for every dollar that Americans
paid in auto insurance premiums, only sixty-five to seventy cents were returned in the form of
paid claims, id. at 15. Although the statistics in the book are now dated, the book provided a
first look at the enormity of the insurance industry.
6. For an interestingjuxtaposition of the differing philosophies that insurers may practice
in their dealings with claimants, see WILUs PARK ROKES, AGGRESSIVE GOOD FArH AND
SUCCESSFUL CLAIMS HANDLING 6-8 (1987).
Rokes also suggests that extremely adversarial claims handling is a thing of the past, and
that this practice has no place in today's insurance climate. Id. at 8. One should compare
Rokes's statements to the stories ofatrocious insurance behavior that come out of courts across
the nation. See SHERNOFF, supra note 2, at 17; see also TOBIAS, supra note 4, at 112-24.
7. For a discussion of the claims-handling characteristics that a company should strive to
meet in order to earn the title of "good faith insurer," see RoKEs, supra note 6, at 107-30.
8. See TOBIAS, supra note 4, at 115, 120. See generally Rokes, supra note 6, at 107-30.
9. See SHERNOFF, supra note 2, at 14, 17; see also Nader, supra note 1, at xi; Paltrow,
supra note 2, at AI
Consumer groups and some state regulators cite growing numbers of
complaints that insurance companies are arbitrarily refusing to pay some
homeowners and automobile claims, or are systematically "low-balling"
customers, offering to pay much less than the full cost of repairs. There are
also complaints of a trend, confirmed by some companies, of canceling or
refusing to renew coverage of customers who have filed even minor claims.
Id.
For an example of an insurer who "never paid full policy limits regardless of the injuries,"
see TOBIAS, supra note 4, at 117 (emphasis in original). The company "adopted the philosophy
that if someone wanted to settle a claim with them they would have to permit [the company]
to save a little from the full policy limits." Id. Tobias relays other disturbing anecdotes about
insurance companies' settlement practices, such as a story of one insurer that "had a quota
aimed at denying half its disability claims," id. at 122, and a story about an insurer that
contracted with its policyholders to cover funeral expenses, but then "indicat[ed] that it was
their practice with regard to funeral expenses not to pay for the cemetery plot, clergyman or
flowers," id.
10. See Nader, supra note I, at ix.
When small claims are rejected by the adjuster, most people give up in disgust.
This is exactly what the insurance companies want you to do. Think about the
2002]
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The conduct ofthe latter type of insurer is precisely why courts began to recognize
the tort of bad faith." Over the years, courts realized that the traditional rules of
contract cannot sufficiently protect the peculiar needs of a client in an insurance
contract.'2 Traditional, arms-length contract principles still govern some portions of
insurance law, but courts increasingly recognize that the relationship between an
insurer and its insured is at times fiduciary. in nature. 3 Insureds rely heavily on
insurers, who are inherently wealthier and better situated to incur the financial risks
of litigation.' Thus, courts bestowed on insureds a powerful right to punish insurers
who manipulate their positional superiority to take advantage of their insureds-the
bad faith cause of action.'" The bad faith cause of action gives policyholders their
greatest means of rebuking insurers' inappropriate conduct. 6
Because insurance companies seem increasingly willing to routinely deny claims
in order to increase company profits, 7 the remedies available to civil litigants become
of the utmost importance-those wronged by insurance companies need rights to
punish the companies' egregious behavior.s This Note examines the rights that civil
litigants in Indiana possess against insurance companies. This Note posits that
Indiana's state law would benefit by granting third-party judgment creditors' 9
millions of honest claims that are never challenged, and you can understand
the surge of wealth generated by most major insurance companies.
Id. (emphasis in original).
11. See SHERNOw, supra note 2, at 16. The tort of bad faith is an alternative to contract
damages for an insurer's failure to perform its contractual duties in good faith. KIMBALL, supra
note 4, at 486. "[M]ost states now recognize a separate cause of action in tort based upon
breach of an independent, judicially imposed duty to fulfill contractual obligations in good
faith." Id.
12. See Daniel S. Bopp, Tort and Contract in Bad Faith Cases: Is the Honeymoon Over?,
59 DEF. CouNs. J. 524, 524 (1992).
13. See Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman by Smith, 622 N.E.2d 515, 518 (Ind. 1993).
14. See SHERNOFF, supra note 2, at 17; see also Bopp, supra note 12, at 527. The common
policyholder probably purchases insurance with the idea that her relationship with her insurer
will be fiduciary in nature. See Nader, supra note 1, at xi. When contracting with an insurance
company, most people believe that they are purchasing protection, rather than "a lot of
vexatious, time-consuming, expensive litigation with [the] insurer." Hayseeds, Inc. v. State
Farm Fire & Cas., 352 S.E.2d 73, 79 (W. Va. 1986); see also SHERNOFF, supra note 2, at 14.
15. See KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 486-88; see also SHERNOFF, supra note 2, at 16; Bopp,
supra note 12, at 526. The bad faith cause of action was borne out of a contractual relationship
between the insurer and the insured, but the action itself sounds in tort. Bopp, supra note 12,
at 524-25.
16. See SHERNOFF, supra note 2, at 16.
17. Id. at 14, 17; see also Nader, supra note 1, at xi; supra notes 9-10 and accompanying
text.
18. SHERNOFF, supra note 2, at 16-19.
19. If a defendant loses the underlying case and owes a debt to. the plaintiff from the
underlying case, then the defendant becomes a "judgment debtor"; the plaintiff that won the
underlying case becomes a "judgment creditor." See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 848 (7th ed.
1999). See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998);
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enhanced rights against insurers, because such rights would provide incentives for
insurers to deal with their policyholders in good faith. This Note then offers a two-part
proposal to improve Indiana's insurance law that would enhance judgment creditors'
rights without extending insurers' duties past the duties they already owe to their
policyholders.
Specifically, Part H of this Note will outline some relevant background information
describing the difference between first-party and third-party insurance. Part I will
then discuss the development of the law of bad faith and highlight certain differences
and innovations in the bad faith law of different jurisdictions. Part IV will discuss the
development of the bad faith tort law in Indiana; this Part will also identify certain
areas of concern that exist in Indiana's current bad faith law. Finally, Part V will draw
upon the discussions from Parts I and IV to suggest modifications of Indiana's bad
faith tort law that would hold insurers more accountable for inappropriate dealings
with their policyholders.
II. BACKGROUND: FIRST-PARTY VS. THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE
The relationship of the parties in an insurance lawsuit affects the rights and
liabilities between the parties.2" First-party insurance entails situations in which an
insurer contracts with an insured to reimburse that person for all losses to her property
that are protected under the limits of her insurance contract.2' Common examples of
first-party insurance policies are fire insurance on a home or automobile collision
insurance.'
Conversely, with third-party insurance, rather than reimbursing an insured for her
own losses, an insurer covers any liability the insured may incur by inflicting damages
on a third party.' Third-party insurance, therefore, involves situations in which an
insurer contracts with an insured to pay covered claims brought against the insured by
a third-party claimant.24 An example of a third-party insurance policy is automobile
MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.04, at 9-26 to 9-29; Willy E. Rice, Judicial Bias, the Insurance
Industry and Consumer Protection: An Empirical Analysis of State Supreme Courts' Bad-
Faith, Breach-of-Contract, Breach-of-Covenant-of-Good-Faith and Excess-Judgment
Decisions, 1900-1991, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 325, 346 n.87 (1992).
20. See Bopp, supra note 12, at 524.
21. Thomas V. Flaherty et al., Developments in West Virginia's Insurance Bad Faith
Law-Where Do We Go From Here?, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 267, 269 (1995).
22. Id.
23. Id. A "third party," in this context, is any person outside of the relationship between
the insurer and those insured under the insurance policy. Brian Neff, Third-Party Claimants
and an Insurer's Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 274, 279 n.38
(1992).
24. Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 269. A "third-party claimant" is a party outside of the
insurance contract between the insurer and its insured; the third-party claimant typically brings
suit against the insured. See id. at 282-83, 292; see also Neff, supra note 23, at 281-82. But,
some third-party claimants also attempt to bring suit directly against the insurer. Flaherty et al.,
supra note 21, at 292.
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liability insurance.' With third-party insurance, the insurer indemnifies its insured for
judgments or settlements up to the limits of the insured's insurance policy.26
Additionally, the insurer in a liability insurance policy assumes a duty to defend
lawsuits brought against its insured;27 thus, liability insurance gives the insurer the
right to conduct any defense or to enter into any settlements for claims brought against
its insured.28
Although an insurer's acts of bad faith may result in tort liability in both the first-
party and third-party contexts,29 the remainder of this Note will discuss bad faith in the
third-party context because the third-party context is an area in which Indiana could
improve its insurance law to enhance the rights ofjudgment creditors and to provide
stronger deterrents against bad faith acts by insurers.
Ill. DEVELOPMENT OF BAD FAITH TORT LAW IN THE THIRD-PARTY CONTEXT
As bad faith tort law continues to develop, courts face the task of resolving the
rights and liabilities between the parties to an insurance dispute. With every expansion
of the law, courts in turn must adjust and redefine these rights and liabilities. This Part
traces this development of bad faith tort law. Sub-Part A explains the typical fact
situation in which bad faith disputes arise; sub-Part B summarizes the initial
development of third-party bad faith law; and sub-Part C explains the rights and
liabilities running among the various parties to a bad faith dispute. This Part also
explores the differences in the tort of bad faith that arose among various jurisdictions,
so that Part IV may later compare Indiana's bad faith doctrine with other existing
doctrines. After Part IV compares the existing doctrines, Part V will draw upon the
doctrines from other jurisdictions to suggest changes to improve Indiana's bad faith
25. Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 269.
26. Id. at 269-70.
27. KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 485; see also Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 270. When
an insurer assumes a duty to defend an insured under a third-party liability insurance contract,
the insurer also assumes a duty to pay the costs of the defense of any lawsuit brought against
the insured. Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 270.
28. Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 270.
29. See Bopp, supra note 12, at 525-27. An insurer may violate its duty of good faith in
many ways, with violations resulting in causes of action for both policyholders and third
parties. Rice, supra note 19, at 333. The most obvious way that an insurer may violate its duty
of good faith is through "a breach of the express terms of the insurance policy." Id. Additional
potential violations include:
attempting to settle a claim without giving notice to the insured; compelling an
insured to sue; delaying the investigation of a claim; delaying the payment of a
claim; denying coverage outright; failing to acknowledge claims; failing to inform
insured about the status of benefits; failing to investigate a claim; failing to defend
a suit; failing to process a claim in a timely fashion; failing to settle claim in a
timely manner; failing to settle within policy limits; intentionally inflicting
emotional distress; refusing to issue a policy; refusing to pay a first-party claim;
refusing to pay a third-party claim; and, terminating an employment contract.
Id. at 333 n.25 (citations omitted).
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law.
A. Situations That Give Rise to Third-Party Bad Faith Actions
In insurance law, the tort of bad faith developed first in the third-party context.30
In this third-party context, the typical fact pattern that creates a claim of bad faith
against an insurer occurs when an insured inflicts damages on a third party, who then
sues the insured for an amount that exceeds the insured's liability insurance policy
limits.3  In this situation, the insurer normally defends the case on behalf of its insured,
which also means that the insurer makes any decisions whether to settle the claim.32
When an insurer steps in to defend one of its insureds, however, the insurer's interests
in defending the case often conflict with the interests of the insured who is being
sued.3"
For instance, if the third party offers to settle its claim at or near the insured's
policy limit, the insured might want to settle the case, end her liability within her
policy limits, and end the hassle of a pending lawsuit."' However, the insurer might
choose not to accept the settlement offer because the company has little to lose by
proceeding to trial.35 The most that the insurer will have to pay in a contract action is
its insured's policy limits, and, by going to trial, the insurer gives itself a chance of
obtaining a verdict in its favor. 6 The insured, on the other hand, has much to lose by
proceeding to trial.37 An.adverse verdict may subject the insured to a judgment that
far exceeds her policy limits?'
With this inequality in mind, courts began to give insureds a tort remedy for an
insurer's failure to act in good faith on behalf of the best interests of its insureds.39 If
an insured might be subjected to a potential liability that would exceed her insurance
policy limits, courts imposed a duty on the insurer to subordinate its interests to the
interests of the insured-even if this is to the financial detriment of the
insurer-because the insured, by purchasing her insurance policy, has bargained for
a contract that guarantees that the insurer will protect her interests against any liability
that she may incur by inflicting damages on others.' Thus, if the case proceeds to trial
30. Bopp, supra note 12, at 525-26; see also Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 282.
31. Flaherty et al., supra note 2 1, at 282-83.
32. Id. at 283.
33. See KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 487.
34. See id.; see also Bopp, supra note 12, at 525; Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 283.
35. KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 487.
36. Id. Or, instead of obtaining a verdict in the insured's favor, the insurer may proceed
to trial in hopes of obtaining a verdict holding that the insured is liable on grounds not covered
by the insurance policy, which would absolve the insurer of any responsibility to the insured.
In that situation, "[tihe insurer's best chance to optimize its own interests in the individual case
might then be to sacrifice the insured rather than to defend vigorously and whole-heartedly."
Id. 534.
37. Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 283.
38. Bopp, supra note 12, at 525; see also Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 283.
39. Bopp, supra note 12, at 525.
40. Id. at 525.
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and the third party obtains a judgment against the insured that exceeds the insured's
policy limits (that is, ajudgment that is greater than the original settlement offer), then
the insured would have a new cause of action against her insurer for the company's
failure to settle the original, underlying claim in good faith.4"'
B. The Origins of an Insurer's Duty of Good
Faith in the Third-Party Context
In the first half of the twentieth century, courts began to recognize that insurers had
a duty to settle when settlement is in the best interests of their insureds.42 Insurers
became liable to their insureds when a company's decision to proceed to trial resulted
in an excess verdict against one of its policyholders.43 With Comunale v. Traders &
General Insurance Co.,' California became the first state to make an insurer's duty
to act in good faith on behalf of its policyholders an implied part of the actual
insurance contract.45 The California Supreme Court stated that an insurer's "implied
obligation of good faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to settle in an appropriate
case[,] although the express terms of the policy do not impose such a duty." The
majority ofjurisdictions followed this trend and now allow bad faith causes of action
in the third-party context.47 Indiana also followed this trend and accepted this cause
of action with Erie Insurance Co. v. Hickanan by Smith" and its progeny.49
C. Parties That May Bring an Action
Based on an Insurer's Bad Faith
After courts recognized the existence of the duty of good faith, they then began the
task of determining which parties may bring an action for an insurer's breach of that
duty. Nearly all jurisdictions allow insureds to bring a bad faith tort action against an
41. KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 486 ("Partly because the insurer usually has a nearly
unlimited right to settle, it has a correlative obligation to perform its duties and exercise its
privileges fairly. Failure to do so may lead to liability for bad faith."); see also MAGARICK,
supra note 4, § 9.01 at 9-1; Bopp, supra note 12, at 525; Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 282-
83.
42. Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 283.
43. Id.
44. 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
45. Id. at 200; see also Bopp, supra note 12, at 526. Although this Note discusses only
the insurer's duty of good faith, "[g]ood faith is an implied duty and should be applicable to
both parties equally." MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-4.1.
46. Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201.
47. See Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman by Smith, 622 N.E.2d 515, 519 & n.2 (Ind. 1993)
("[Tlhe majority of states recognize a cause of action in tort in the context of third-party claims
.... "); see also MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.01, at 9-I.
48. 622 N.E.2d 515 (Ind. 1993).
49. Erie, 622 N.E.2d at 519; see also Gooch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 712
N.E.2d 38, 39-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Dimitroff v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 647
N.E.2d 339, 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
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insurer. 6 Likewise, most jurisdictions allow an assignee of the insured's claim to
bring the claim against an insurer.5 However, third parties (whether they are third-
party claimants52 or third-party judgment creditors53) rarely may bring a claim against
an insurer without an assignment from an insured. The following sections explore
more thoroughly how a party's position in the case affects that party's right to bring
a bad faith cause of action.
1. Insureds
Courts have willingly recognized an insurer's duty to act in good faith toward its
insureds in the third-party liability context because of the unique relationship of the
parties to an insurance contract.' The contractual relationship between an insurer and
an insured "is at times a traditional arms-length dealing between two parties, as in the
initial purchase of a policy, but is also at times one of a fiduciary nature."'5" An
insurer's duty of good faith "arises because an insured purchases a policy to obtain
protection from claims made by third parties,"' and, in doing so, "[tihe insured
typically surrenders to the insurer the right to control the defense and settlement of the
50. See infra Part III.C.I.
51. See infra Part III.C.2.
52. See infra Part III.C.3.
53. See infra Part III.C.4.
54. Bopp, supra note 12, at 524; see, e.g., Erie, 622 N.E.2d at 518-19.
55. Erie, 622 N.E.2d at 518. Notice that the Indiana Supreme Court used the term "of a
fiduciary nature" in Erie, because an insurance company does not maintain a true fiduciary
relationship with its insureds, MAGARICKsupra note4, § 12.16, at 12-25, as does atrustee with
a beneficiary of a trust, a guardian with a ward, an agent with a principal, or an attorney with
her client, see generally BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 640 (7th ed. 1999). Nevertheless, many
commentators analogize the insurer's duty of good faith to a fiduciary duty owed to its
insureds. See, e.g., MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 12.16, at 12-23 to 12-24 ("There is no doubt
that an insurer has a fiduciary duty to look after the interests of its insured when evaluating an
offer of settlement within the policy limits. Failure of an insurer to inform its insured of offers
to settle within the policy limits has been held to be bad faith in violation of its fiduciary
relationship."). The insurer's "special relationship" with its insured, Erie, 622 N.E.2d at 518,
whether termed a fiduciary duty or a duty of good faith, imposes on the insurer many
affirmative duties. For example:
To handle an insured's defense in good faith, the insurer must do several things:
it must determine whether the complaint against the insured states facts that could
potentially lead to liability falling within the policy coverage and, if so, proceed
with the defense; it must not withdraw from the insured's defense in bad faith; it
must handle the mechanical aspects of the insured's defense (investigation,
depositions, settlement negotiations, conduct at trial, etc.) in good faith. Then, if
liability and coverage are established, the insurer must pay without inappropriate
resistance or delay.
KIMBALI, supra note 4, at 486-87.
56. Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 294.
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litigation."' Since the insured places control of its lawsuit in the hands of the insurer,
the insurer consequently must make "an aggressive good faith effort to settle and
protect its insured.""8 The part of the insurance liability contract that requires an
insurer to defend its insured imposes on the insurer a fiduciary responsibility to act in
good faith toward its insured. 9
An insurer's duty of good faith requires the insurer to safeguard its insureds'
interests as if it were looking after its own interests.' By extending a duty of good
faith from insurer to insured, courts bolster policyholders' chances of receiving the
contractual benefits that they purchased from their insurers.6' Because this duty
promotes performance of the contract, it is no wonder that courts willingly offered this
means for an insured to recover for its insurer's failure to fulfill the duty of good faith.
Today, the vast majority ofjurisdictions recognize an insured's right to bring an action
against its insurer if the insurer breaches its duty of good faith.62
2. Assignees
After an insurer's acts of bad faith result in an excess judgment against its insured,
courts almost unanimously allow the insured to bring an action against its insurer.63
Moreover, if the insured has assigned" its rights tO bring the action against the insurer
to the injured third party (the original claimant), most courts allow the third party
(now the "assignee") to bring the action in its own name against the insurer.6' For the
third party to gain this right to a cause of action against the insurer by assignment, the
insured must first be harmed by the insurer's bad faith failure to settle the underlying
57. Id.
58. Id. at 293-94 (quoting Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 773
(W. Va. 1990)).
59. Neff, supra note 23, at 279 (quoting Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 430 P.2d 576,
578 (Utah 1967)).
60. Id.
61. Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 296.
62. Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman by Smith, 622 N.E.2d 515, 519 & n.2 (Ind. 1993); see also
MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.01, at 9-1; Eugene R. Anderson & Joshua Gold, Assignment of
Insurance Claims by Policyholders to Underlying Claimants, I PRACTISING L. INST. 687, 715
(1997); Rice, supra note 19, at 344.
63. MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.01, at 9- 1; see also Anderson & Gold, supra note 62,
at 713; Rice, supra note 19, at 344.
64. "An assignment is a transfer or setting over of property, or of some right or interest
therein, from one person to another." ALEXANDER M. BURRII.L, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS § 1, at I (James
Avery Webb ed., 6th ed. 1894), quoted in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 115 (7th ed. 1999). For
an example of an assignment agreement, see Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collins, 643 N.E.2d
382, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
65. MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-2; see, e.g., Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins.
Co., 328 P.2d 198,202 (Cal. 1958); see also Anderson & Gold, supra note 62, at 691-92; Rice,
supra note 19, at 344-45.
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claim against the insured.' This gives the insured a cause of action against the insurer,
which, in many states, the insured may then assign to a third party.' The third party
may then step into the shoes of the insured and bring the action as if it were her own."
In consideration for the assignment, the insured may receive a covenant from the third
party to no longer hold the insured liable for the underlying claim 9 Thus, with an
assignment, the insured relieves itself of liability for the excess judgment, and the
injured third party enjoys a means of reaching the deep pockets of the insurance
company, which is especially important when an insolvent insured cannot pay the full
amount of the excess judgment."'
Although the majority of courts allow the assignment of at least some rights from
the insured to the third party, courts are anything but unanimous concerning what
types of claims (that is, tort claims or contract claims) are assignable and what types
of damages (that is, pecuniary damages,7' consequential and/or compensatory
damages,72 bad faith tort damages, or punitive damages) are recoverable from the
insurer after the assignment.73 This division among the courts concerning assignment
developed due to the differing ways courts construe a breach of the covenant of good
faith in an insurance contract.74 Some jurisdictions interpret the cause of action that
results from a breach of the insurer's covenant of good faith as a breach of contract,
while others construe the cause of action as a tort."'
66. See MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-2; see also Flaherty et al., supra note 21,
at 282-83; supra Part III.A.
67. MAGAIUCK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-2; see also Anderson & Gold, supra note 62,
at 692; Rice, supra note 19, at 344-45.
68. MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-2; see also Anderson & Gold, supra note 62,
at 692.
69. MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02[2], at9-15 to 9-16; see also Anderson & Gold, supra
note 62, at 694-95, 695 n.10 ("To settle the tort claim and to ameliorate the effects of an
insurance coverage denial, a policyholder will typically assign its rights under its liability
policy to the underlying claimant in exchange for a covenant by the claimant not to execute on
any judgment against the policyholder."). For an example of an assignment agreement, see
Economy Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collins, 643 N.E.2d 382, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
70. See MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.04, at 9-27 to 9-28; see also Rice, supra note 19,
at 344-45, 345 n.84.
71. A pecuniary loss is a "loss of money or of something having monetary value."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 957 (7th ed. 1999). In the third-party insurance context, the
insured's pecuniary damages are the amount of the excess judgment. See Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Axsom, 696 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
72. See JOHN C. McCARTHY, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR BAD FAiTH § 2.65, at 471-73
(5th ed. 1990).
73. See MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 10.02[ 1 ], at 10-7 to 10-8; see also Anderson & Gold,
supra note 62, at 71.3-714; Rice, supra note 19, at 333 ("[B]oth the amount and the types of
damages recoverable under an implied covenant of good faith seriously divide state supreme
courts.').
74. See Rice, supra note 19, at 334 (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nicholson, 777
P.2d 1152, 1154-1155 (Alaska 1989)).
75. Id.; see also Anderson & Gold, supra note 62, at 716.
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How a court interprets the cause of action-whether as a breach of contract or a
tort-affects the claim's assignability.7 6 Contract claims are normally assignable,77 but
doubts exist as to the assignability of certain types of tort claims. If the insured's
claim against the insurer is construed as a tort claim, some courts disallow assignment
of the tort because, as a general rule, torts for personal injuries are not assignable.7 9
However, the majority of courts do allow the assignment of a bad faith tort
claimn--often because the court will construe the underlying injury as an injury to the
insured's property, rather than as an injury to the insured's person."' Actions from a
tort to real or personal property are assignable.' Courts are willing to allow such an
assignment ofa tort claimbecause the assignment satisfies the reasonable expectations
of the insured-that it will not be held liable for an excess judgment.83 Despite some
lingering differences between jurisdictions, most courts hold that bad faith causes of
action are assignable whether the action is based in contract or in tort.
4
The manner in which a court construes a breach of an insurance contract may also
affect the damages available following an assignment. The general rule is that punitive
damages are not available in a breach of contract claim, and some courts hold that this
is true even for claims based on an insurer's bad faith breach of an insurance
contract."5 Accordingly, if the insured's claim against the insurer is strictly construed
as a contract claim, some courts only allow recovery for the amount of the policy
limits on the insurance contract." If, however, the insured's claim is construed as an
independent tort claim, some courts will allow recovery for consequential damages
(due to "economic loss and emotional distress") plus punitive damages.' Still other
courts confusingly allow plaintiffs in breach of contract actions to pursue all of the
76. See generally Anderson & Gold, supra note 62, at 715-16; Rice, supra note 19, at
344-50.
77. See MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-2; see also Anderson & Gold, supra note
62, at 716; Rebecca J. Seamands, "Lawsuitfor Sale": An Analysis oftheAssignability ofLegal
Malpractice Claims, 25 IND. L. REv. 257, 266 (1991).
78. See MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-2; see also Anderson & Gold, supra note
62, at 713-716; Rice, supra note 19, at 344-46.
79. MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-4.2; see, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Axsom, 696
N.E.2d 482,485 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); see also Anderson & Gold, supra note 62, at 713-714,
716; Rice, supra note 19, at 344 ("As most first-year law students discover, the common-law
is fairly settled on one point: personal-injury tort claims are not assignable.") (emphasis in
original).
80. Anderson & Gold, supra note 62, at 716; see also Rice, supra note 19, at 344.
81. MCCARTHY, supra note 72, § 2.60, at 455-56.
82. Id.; see also Seamands, supra note 77, at 266.
83. Rice, supra note 19, at 344-45.
84. MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-2; see also Anderson & Gold, supra note 62,
at 715-17; Rice, supra note 19, at 344-45.
85. MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 19.02, at 19-16.
86. See Rice, supra note 19, at 333-34, 334 n.26 (citing Santilli v. State Farm Life Ins.
Co., 562 P.2d 965, 969 (Or. 1977)).
87. Id. at 334.
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damages available in a tort claim, including punitive damages."' Visibly, courts may
choose from many different theories of recovery to augment their bad faith insurance
law; but, regardless of which theory a particular court chooses, it should express its
theory clearly and decisively to help litigants decide which damages to seek and
whether their case is one in which an assignment is allowed. 9
As is evident, the manner in which a court construes the claim that develops as a
result of an insurer's breach of its duty of good faith greatly affects the rights of the
parties involved. Nevertheless, "assignability ... is now the rule; nonassignability, the
exception."'
3. Third-Party Claimants
After courts commonly accepted insureds' and assignees' rights to bring bad faith
tort claims against insurers,9 third-party claimants then began to bring actions based
on bad faith directly against insurers.' Like an assignee, third-party claimants are
plaintiffs that are outside of the original contractbetween the insurer and the insured.93
But, unlike an assignee, a third-party claimant brings a claim directly against the
insurer without first winning an underlying case and receiving an assignment from the
insured.' Moreover, a third-party claimant does not hold an executory judgment95
against the insured, as does a judgment creditor.' By suing insurers, third-party
claimants essentially asked courts to extend the insurer's duty of good faith to include
an adversarial plaintiff who is suing the insurer's client9 -- the same client that the
insurer is supposed to protect.98 Despite the potential conflicts that would arise for an
insurer if it were held both to a duty of good faith toward third-party claimants and to
a duty to act in the best interests of its insureds," third-party claimants attempted to
88.Id.
89. Id. at 345.
90. Seamands, supra note 77, at 266; see, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d
482,485 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) ("[Tlhe types of torts which may not be assigned have become
so narrow that [the] nonassignability of tort actions is now the exception while assignability
is the general rule.").
91. See supra Parts III.C.1, III.C.2.
92. Flaherty et al.,supra note 21, at292; e.g., Dimitroffv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
647 N.E.2d 339, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Eichler v. Scott Pools, Inc., 513 N.E.2d 665, 667-
68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); see also Neff, supra note 23, at 279.
93. See MAGAR[CK, supra note 4, § 9.03, at 9-20 to 9-26; see also Flaherty et al., supra
note 21, at 292; Neff, supra note 23, at 282-83.
94. See MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.03, at 9-20 to § 9.05, at 9-32.
95. An executoryjudgment is "[a] judgment that has not been carried out." BLACK'S LAW
DiCTiONARY 846 (7th ed. 1999).
96. See MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.03, at 9-20 to 9-21; see also Flaherty et al., supra
note 21, at 292; Neff, supra note 23, at 282-83.
97. Neff, supra note 23, at 279.
98. See supra Part III.B.
99. Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 296-99.
2002]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
justify the extension of this duty by professing to be third-party beneficiaries"° of the
contract between the insurer and the insured.' Courts, however, overwhelmingly
rejected third-party claimants' attempts to associate themselves with the insurance
contract," categorizing them instead as adversarial claimants. 3 Therefore, almost
all jurisdictions, including Indiana, ! 4 declined to extend an insurer's duty of good
faith to third-party claimants."3
The primary reason courts refused to extend an insurer's duty of good faith to cover
third-party claimants is because an insurer's duty of good faith develops from the
contractual relationship between the insurer and its policyholders, and a third-party
claimant has no contractual relationship with the insurer."°6 Unlike the relationship
between an insurer and an insured, the relationship between an insurer and a third-
party claimant lacks the bargained-for rights that come with the endorsement of an
insurance contract."7 A third-party claimant has neither bargained for nor purchased
any insurance protection from the insurer."8 Nor has a third-party claimant given the
insurer the right to conduct litigation on the claimant's behalf." Transactions between
insurance companies and third-party claimants take place at arm's length, without any
of the fiduciary-like duties that sometimes run from insurer to insured."'
100. A third-party beneficiary is "[a] person who, though not a party to a contract, stands
to benefit from the contract's performance." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 149 (7th ed. 1999).
10 1. See, e.g., Eichler v. Scott Pools, Inc., 513 N.E.2d 665, 667 (Ind. Ct App. 1987); see
Neff, supra note 23, at 279-80. Third-party beneficiaries are typically parties other than the
insured that are actually covered by the insured's policy, such as passengers in an insured's
automobile. See Snow v. Bayne, 449 N.E.2d 296, 298-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
102. Flaherty, supra note 21, at 294; e.g., Eichler, 513 N.E.2d at 667.
A claimant has no standing to sue the defendant's insurer for handling a claim
negligently or in bad faith. There is no duty running from the insurer to the
claimant to settle a claim, nor is the claimant a third-party beneficiary of the
duty owed the insured by the insurer.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Neff, supra note 23, at 280.
103. See Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 296-97.
104. E.g., Dimitroff v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 647 N.E.2d 339, 342 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1995); Eichler, 513 N.E.2d at 667-68.
105. MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-2; see also Flaherty, supra note 21, at 294 &
n. 130; Neff, supra note 23, at 280 & n.47. The states that do allow direct actions by third-party
claimants usually do so by interpreting their state's Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act so
that third-party claimants may bring a suit directly against an insurer. Timothy D. Beets, Third-
Party Direct Suits: Why Doesn't Oklahoma HoldAutomobile Liability Insurers as Accountable
as Their Insureds?, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 315, 316 (1999).
106. MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.03, at 9-20 to 9-21; e.g., Neff, supra note 23, at 280
(noting that the Utah Supreme Court refused to allow a third-party claimant to bring a bad faith
action against an insurer because the third party "had no privity of contract with the insurer")
(citing Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 430 P.2d 576, 577 (Utah 1967)).
107. See Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 296-97.
108. Id. at 294.
109. Id.
110. Neff, supra note 23, at 283; supra Part III.C. 1.
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Furthermore, the interests of the insured conflict with the interests of the third-party
claimant-the insurer cannot help one party without hurting the other."' In other
words, if an insurer were held to a duty of good faith both to a third-party claimant
and to its insured, the insurer could not act in the best interests of one party without
compromising the interests of the other." 2 A judicial policy that requires an insurer
to compromise the interests of its insureds would directly defeat the purpose of the
doctrine of good faith"3 expounded by Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance
Co. "4 and its progeny-that an insurer should aggressively protect the interests of its
insureds." 5 Therefore, because a third-party claimant is essentially a stranger to the
insurance contract, the reasons for giving an insured a tort action for a breach of the
duty of good faith do not exist for a third-party claimant to bring such an action." 6
Most courts understandably denied attempts by third-party claimants to expand the
good faith law.
4. Third-Party Judgment Creditors Without an
Assignment: Florida Breaks New Ground
In 1971, the Supreme Court of Florida in Thompson v. Commercial Union
Insurance Co."' held that judgment creditors could bring suit directly against an
insurer without first receiving an assignment of such a right from the insured."" The
Thompson decision seemed to convert all third parties in Florida into third-party
beneficiaries of the contract between the insurer and the insured." 9 The court held that
11. Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 296-97.
112. Id. at 297-99. For example, if a third-party claimant wants to settle but the insured
believes that it did nothing wrong and would prefer rather to proceed to trial (in order to protect
its insurance record or to keep its premiums down), the insurer must decide whose wishes to
uphold and whose wishes to compromise. Id. at 297-98. If the insurer-acting in consideration
of a duty of good faith to third-party claimants-upholds the third-party claimant's wishes to
settle, then the insured's wishes to defend the suit would be compromised. Id. at 298. This
violates the insurer's requirement to aggressively uphold the interests of its insureds which is
the very purpose of an insurer's duty of good faith to its insureds. See id. at 293-94, 297-99.
Or, even when the insured and the third-party claimant both favor settlement, the preferred
amount of the settlement could differ between the two parties. Id. at 298-99. The third-party
claimant desires to settle for as much money as it can, and the insured has an interest in keeping
the settlement low to preserve the rest of the money available under its policy in case additional
claims are made against the policy. Id. Here, the insurer would likely choose a settlement
amount in between the preferred amounts of the two parties, which effectively compromises
the strongest wishes of both parties. Id. at 299. This also violates the insurer's primary
requirement of behaving in furtherance of its duty of good faith to its insureds. Id.
113. See id. at 299.
114.328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
115. See id. at 200-02; see also Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 293-94.
116. Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 294.
117. 250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971).
118. Id. at 264.
119. Id. at 262, 264.
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a third party's status as a third-party beneficiary allowed the third party to bring a
direct action against the insurer when the insurer handled the suit in bad faith. 20
After Thompson, Florida appeared to be the lone standout against the trend that
declined to extend the duty of good faith from an insurer to third parties. 2 To some,
the third party's status as a beneficiary of the insurance contract appeared to denote
that a Florida insurer's duty of good faith extended to the third party." This
interpretation led legal scholars and courts in other jurisdictions to attack the position
taken by the Supreme Court of Florida. Legal scholars interpreted Thompson to mean
that Florida had adopted a position contrary to the majority ofjurisdictions, which
steadfastly disallowed third parties from bringing a direct action against an insurer. "
Courts in other jurisdictions refused to adopt Florida's position when third parties
pressed for such an extension of the law, 24 characterizing the Thompson decision as
"legally and logically unsound."'"
However, the Supreme Court of Florida refined the Thompson decision in a later
decision, Fidelity & Casualty Co. ofNew York v. Cope.'26 In Cope, the Supreme Court
of Florida explained that
[njowhere in Thompson ... did we change the basis or theory of recovery. We
did not extend the duty of good faith by an insurer to its insured to a duty of
an insurer to a third party. The basis for an action remained the damages of an
insured from the bad faith action of the insurer which caused its insured to
suffer a judgment for damages above his policy limits. Thompson merely
allowed the third party to bring such action in his own name without an
assignment.'27
"[E]very automobile liability insurance policy should be construed as a third party
beneficiary contract entitling a judgment creditor to recover in a direct action
against the insured for the excess of hisjudgment over policy limits in those cases
where the insurer is guilty of negligence or bad faith in handling the claim."
Id. at 262 (quoting Canal Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 114 So. 2d 469, 472 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(Wigginton, C.J., specially concurring)).
120. Id. at 264 ("[We] hold that ajudgment creditor maymaintain suit directly against [a]
tortfeasor's liability insurer for recovery of the judgment in excess of the policy limits, based
upon the alleged fraud or bad faith of the insurer in the conduct or handling of the suit.").
121. See Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 294 & n.130; see also Neff, supra note 23, at
280-81.
122. Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 294 & n.130.
123. Neff, supra note 23, at 280-81 ("Florida is the only state to fully recognize a
judgment creditor's right to claim the benefit of the insurer's good faith duty to its insured.
That position has been widely attacked in other jurisdictions.") (citation omitted); see also
Flaherty et al., supra note 21, at 294 & n.130.
124. See, e.g., Page v. Allstate Ins. Co., 614 P.2d 339, 340 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980)
(Howard, J., concurring); Bennett v. Slater, 289 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Neff,
supra note 23, at 281 n.49.
125. Page, 614 P.2d at 340 (Howard, J., concurring).
126. 462 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1985)
127. Id. at 460-61 (emphasis added).
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With this statement, the Supreme Court of Florida cleared up its position concerning
the rights of a third party to bring an action directly against an insurer. Cope clarified
that third-party claimants could not bring an action against an insurer in Florida.2 '
Only after the third-party claimant became a judgment creditor could it step into the
shoes of the insured and bring an action against the insurer based on the damages that
the insurance company caused the insured in the underlying case." With the Cope
decision, the Supreme Court of Florida distanced itself somewhat from the position
that had been heavily criticized by both legal scholars and by courts in other
jurisdictions."' At the same time, however, the Thompson and Cope decisions
distinguished Florida from the rest of the nation by eliminating a judgment creditor's
need to receive an assignment from the judgment debtor as a prerequisite to a suit
directly against the insurer.'
Cope rephrased Florida's bad faith insurance doctrine so that Florida's law did not
appear quite as opposed to the insurance doctrine of other states. Cope cleared up any
confusion that mayhave existed after Thompson by declaring that, in Florida, insurers
have no duty to deal with third-party claimants in good faith." The Thompson and
Cope decisions merely allow third-party judgment creditors to bring an action against
an insurer to collect the damages of an insured.' 3 Florida justified its decision to allow
ajudgment creditor to sue an insurer without an assignment from the insured because
the Thompson and Cope courts had maintained that a liability insurance policy is
meant to offer protection for the benefit of the injured third party as well as for the
insured." Under the reasoning of the Thompson and Cope courts, the implied
covenant of good faith in a liability insurance contract carries with it an additional
128. Id. at 461.
129. Id.; see also McLeod v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 621, 625 n.6 (Fla. 1992)
(construing Thompson and Cope). To be fair, the Thompson decision held only that a
'Yudgment creditor may maintain suit directly against [a] tortfeasor's liability insurer for
recovery of the judgment in excess of the policy limits...." Thompson v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 259,264 (Fla. 1971) (emphasis added). However, the radical nature of the
new rights bestowed on third parties in Florida following Thompson may have led some to
believe that Florida extended an insurer's duty of good faith to cover a third party. See Flaherty
et al., supra note 21, at 294 & n.130.
130. Indeed, other sources continued to take exception to Thompson because Florida still
allowed ajudgment creditor to bring a claim against an insurer without an assignment from the
insured. See Neff, supra note 23, at 280-81, 281 n.49. But, at least Cope cleared up any
ambiguity that may have existed as to the duty (in other words, the lack thereof) owed by an
insurer to a third party in Florida. See Cope, 462 So. 2d at 460-61.
131. See Cope, 462 So. 2d at 461; see also Thompson, 250 So. 2d at 264.
132. Cope, 462 So. 2d at 461.
133. Id.
134. See Cope, 462 So. 2d at 460-61; see also Thompson, 250 So. 2d at 262; MAGARICK,
supra note 4, § 9.05, at 9-31; Rice, supra note 19, at 346 ("Liability insurance is purchased,
primarily to recompense injured third parties. Therefore, one would expect such parties to have
little difficulty obtaining the right to commence direct-action suits against liability carriers for
extracontractual damages.") (citations omitted).
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protection that most jurisdictions do not recognize-protection for an injured third
party from an insured's insolvency. 3 s Thus, the Thompson and Cope decisions
represent a clear attempt by the Supreme Court of Florida to extend Florida's
insurance law without offending the policies that are important to most commentators
on bad faith insurance law.
After Cope, Florida's position on third-party claims is unlike that of most other
states. Nevertheless, the policies behind Florida's third-party insurance law do not
vary greatly from the policies of the other states. Many states allow third parties to
bring an action against an insurer if the insured first incurs a loss due to the insurer's
bad faith and then assigns to the third party the right to the action against the
insurer. 36 The only difference between Florida and other jurisdictions is that in
Florida, Thompson and Cope allow a third-party judgment creditor to bring a bad faith
tort suit directly against an insurer without an assignment from the insured.' The
cases following Thompson emphasized that Thompson "merely allowed the judgment
creditor to step into the shoes of the insured and bring an action without an assignment
by the insured."' The Supreme Court of Florida allows judgment creditors to pursue
an action directly against the insurer "to remove the burden of the excess judgment
from the shoulders of the insured."'3 9 Thus, Florida's policy gives third parties
essentially the same substantive rights and recoveries as other states, only Florida
removes the additional requirement of the assignment.4 '
Florida occupies a progressive position in the world of third-party insurance law.
But, while Florida accomplished a progressive shift for its law, the state did not
135. Rice, supra note 19, at 347. See generally MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.04, at 9-27
to 9-28 ("[Ihe original purpose of [liability] insurance [is] to see that negligently injured
plaintiffs should have some responsible source of recompense. In many states the insured is
forced to buy automobile insurance just so that judgment-proof insureds will give some
protection to injured third parties.").
136. E.g., Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198,202 (Cal. 1958); see
MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-2; see also Anderson & Gold, supra note 62, at 691-92;
Rice, supra note 19, at 344-45; supra Part III.C.2.
137. Cope, 462 So. 2d at 460-61; see also Thompson, 250 So. 2d at 264; Neff, supra note
23, at 280-81.
138. McLeod v. Continental Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 621, 625 n.6 (Fla. 1992) (construing
Thompson and Cope).
139. Id.
140. In the 1990s, Florida flirted with the idea of allowing a direct action by third-party
claimants based on Florida's Unfair Insurance Practices Act, which was enacted in 1995. See
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Conquest, 658 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1995); see also Zebrowski v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 673 So. 2d 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), quashed and rev'd by State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Zebrowski, 706 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1997); Beets, supra note 105, at 324-
25. However, the Supreme Court of Florida eventually ruled that Florida's Unfair Insurance
Practices Act merely had the effect of codifying Thompson and Cope; thus, a third party could
only file a bad faith claim against an insurer after winning an excess judgment against the
insured in the underlying case. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Zebrowski, 706 So. 2d 275,277
(Fla. 1997); see also Beets, supra note 105, at 325.
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change the basic duties running between insurers, insureds, and third parties.' In
Florida, the duty of good faith runs only between the insurer and the insured, and the
third party is still an adversarial claimant.42 The rights of the parties differ in Florida
only after an excess judgment occurs.4 3 Florida courts, by removing the additional
step of the assignment, attempt to promote enforcement of claims made against
insurers based on the insurers' acts of bad faith.4
There is no doubt that Florida's position is very progressive, very pro-insured, and
pro-third party; but this seems to be the trend in insurance law. 45 Since California first
recognized an insurer's implied duty of good faith in Comunale v. Traders & General
Insurance Co.,' the trend in insurance law is for courts to bestow increasingly more
rights on the "little guys"--the insureds and the aggrieved third parties. 47 This trend,
however, is not popular with all scholars in the insurance field. Many scholars
maintain that there is nothing inherently unfair about an insurance contract, and
awarding huge payoffs to litigants for an insurer's bad faith only raises the premiums
paid by all other purchasers of insurance. 14 Nevertheless, the urge to interpret the
relationship between insurance companies and their insureds as a David versus
Goliath struggle 149 (with the insureds and third parties in need of extracontractual
protection) has been too overwhelming for most in the judiciary to resist. 5 ' As a
result, insureds and third parties in jurisdictions across the country enjoy more
protection now than they ever have in the past.' Therefore, while Florida's position
undoubtedly has its advantages and disadvantages, it is a position that is in tune with
the current trends in insurance law. Florida's position is one that shouldbe studied and
141. See McLeod, 591 So. 2d at 625 & n.6.; see also Cope, 462 So. 2d at 460-61.
142. See McLeod, 591 So. 2d at 625 n.6; see also Cope, 462 So. 2d at 460-61.
143. See McLeod, 591 So. 2d at 625 n.6; see also Cope, 462 So. 2d at460-61; Thompson,
250 So. 2d at 264; MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 19.05, at 9-31.
144. See McLeod, 591 So. 2d at 625 n.6.
145. See generally Anderson & Gold, supra note 62, at 691-95; Bopp, supra note 12, at
524; Rice, supra note 19, at 327-28, 340-50.
146. 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958).
147. See generally Bopp, supra note 12, at 524, 526; Rice, supra note 19, at 327-28, 340-
50.
148. See generally MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-2 to § 9.05, at 9-32; Rice, supra
note 19, at 327-28, 340-50.
149. See Bopp, supra note 12, at 524.
T[he Law] recognizes the relationship between policyholders and their
insurance companies as "special." Viewed as no other contract is, an insurance
policy is seen as bringing together a vulnerable, trusting seeker of protection
and a financiallyhyper-fortified institution. So characterized, disputes between
insurers and insureds take on a David-and-Goliath aspect: little guys
hopelessly pitted against towering organizational juggernauts.
Id.
150. See generally MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-2 to § 9.05, at 9-32; Rice, supra
note 19, at 327-28, 340-50.
151. See generally MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.02, at 9-2 to § 9.05, at 9-32; Bopp, supra
note 12, at 524; Rice, supra note 19, at 327-28, 340-50.
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seriously considered by other jurisdictions that want their insurance law to promote
the judicial policies of protecting insureds and enforcing an insurer's duty to deal with
insureds in good faith.
Now that the history of bad faith law, its peculiarities, and its divisions among
jurisdictions"2 have been examined, Part IV will compare Indiana's bad faith law to
the law of other jurisdictions. Then, Part V will propose suggestions for how Indiana
may improve its bad faith law.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF INDIANA'S BAD FAITH TORT LAW
Indiana courts, like courts in many jurisdictions, developed the state's bad faith law
over time, adding and fine-tuning existing insurance law to adapt to the new bad faith
doctrine. 3' Along the way, Indiana courts looked to other jurisdictions for guidance
and, at times, adopted the reasoning of influential decisions from other courts in
formulating Indiana's law." This Part traces the development of Indiana's bad faith
law and identifies certain areas of concern that remain in Indiana's law. Then, Part V
will suggest how Indiana courts can address these areas of concern.
In Erie Insurance Co. v. Hickman by Smith, 5 ' the Indiana Supreme Court first
recognized an insurer's duty to deal with its insureds in good faith.'56 Since Erie,
Indiana's bad faith insurance law has been in a state of flux. Courts in the state have
152. See, e.g., Bopp, supra note 12, at 524.
Courts, recognizing the unique peculiarities of the insurance environment,
now have fashioned an equally unique creation for policyholders-an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The implied covenant possesses an
essence of contract with the bloodlines of tort, a breed so curious that courts
experience division, ambivalence and inconsistency in establishing its
contours. Having matured from third-party to first-party application, the
covenant-based bad faith action has become an effective weapon for insureds
and is now recognized by a majority ofjurisdictions, some characterizing it as
tort, other preferring contract or statutory expression.
Id.
153. See, e.g., Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman by Smith, 622 N.E.2d 515 (Ind. 1993); Menefee
v. Schurr, No. 79A02-0010-CV-639, 2001 WL 727202 (Ind. Ct. App. June 27, 2001); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Dimitroffv. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 647 N.E.2d 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Economy Fire & Fire Cas. Co. v. Collins, 643
N.E.2d 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Eichler v. Scott Pools, Inc., 513 N.E.2d 665, 667-68 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1987); Snow v. Bayne, 449 N.E.2d 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Bennett v. Slater, 289
N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Kingan & Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 115 N.E.348 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1917).
154. See, e.g., Erie, 622 N.E.2d at 519 n.1 (noting that a majority of jurisdictions
recognize a cause of action for an insurer's breach of its duty of good faith, the Indiana
Supreme Court also adopted such a right); Bennett, 289 N.E.2d at 147-48 (adopting the
position of the majority ofjurisdictions that a third-party judgment creditor may not bring a
claim against an insurer without first receiving an assignment of that claim from the insured).
155. 622 N.E.2d 515 (Ind. 1993).
156. Id. at 519.
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defined and redefined the parameters of the tort since its inception in 1993."
Erie held that an insurer's breach of the duty of good faith it owes to its insureds
can result in a cause of action in tort,15 but it declined to define the parameters of that
cause of action.'" Specifically, Erie declined to resolve whether an insured's cause
of action for breach of the duty of good faith applied in the first-party or the third-
party context."W Nevertheless, since Erie, Indiana courts now acknowledge causes of
action brought by insureds for the breach of the duty of good faith in the first-party
context. 6' Indiana courts also acknowledge causes of action brought by insureds for
their insurers' failure to defend them from liability in the third-party context.'62
Indiana courts explicitly refuse, however, to recognize any bad faith action brought
by a third party claimant directly against an insurer when the third party has not first
received an assignment from the insured for the right to bring that claim. 63 These
parts of Indiana law are well settled, unproblematic, and in agreement with principles
adopted by most jurisdictions.'"
However, this Note addresses two parts of Indiana law that remain problematic.
The first problem is the requirement that third-party judgment creditors receive an
assignment from the tortfeasor insured (the judgment debtor) before they may bring
a bad faith claim against an insurer. The Indiana Court of Appeals entrenched the
assignment requirement into Indiana law in Bennett v. Slater, 65 and the rule from
Bennett has remained the law ever since.'" This Note posits that the assignment
requirement is an unnecessary requirement that allows insurers, in certain situations,
to avoid bad faith judgments in excess of policy limits altogether. 67 Insurers can
157. E.g., Menefee 2001 WL 727202; Axsom, 696 N.E.2d 482; Dimitroff, 647 N.E.2d
339; Collins, 643 N.E.2d 382.
158. Erie, 622 N.E.2d at 519.
159. Id. at 519 n.2 ("Although the majority of states recognize a cause of action in tort in
the context of third-party claims and a lesser number for first party claims... there is no
uniform approach among individual states. Given the variety of ways in which tort claims for
the failure of the insurer to exercise good faith may arise... it is neither necessary nor prudent
for us to fully define the parameters of the tort in this opinion.") (citations omitted).
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., USA Life One Ins. Co. of Ind. v. Nuckolls, 682 N.E.2d 534,536, 541-42
(Ind. 1997).
162. See, e.g., Gooch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 712 N.E.2d 38, 39-41 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999); Dimitroffv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 647 N.E.2d 339,341 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995). See generally MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.01, at 9-1.
163. E.g., Menefee v. Schurr, No. 79A02-0010-CV-639, 2001 WL 727202, at *1, 3-4
(Ind. Ct. App. June 27,2001); Dimitroff, 647 N.E.2d at 342; Eichler v. Scott Pools, Inc., 513
N.E.2d 665, 667-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
164. See supra Parts II, III.C. 1-3.
165. 289 N.E.2d 144, 147-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
166. See, e.g., Menefee, 2001 WL 727202, at *3 (citing Bennett in positive terms).
167. Indiana's assignment requirement is not a problem because Indiana stands alone in
its application-on the contrary, Indiana stands with avast majority ofjurisdictions that require
an assignment, with Florida remaining as one of the lone standouts. See MAGARICK, supra note
4, § 9.04, at 9-26; see also Beets, supra note 105, at 316. This Note argues, rather, that the
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completely avoid the portion of a bad faithjudgment that exceeds the insured's policy
limits when the insured (1) refuses to pursue her bad faith claim on her own and (2)
further refuses to assign her bad faith claim over to the third-party judgment creditor.
This is a lingering problem in Indiana law-one that allows certain lucky insurers
(who acted in bad faith, nonetheless) to escape liability for an excess judgment merely
due to complications in the assignment process. Part V.A addresses this problem by
arguing that Indiana would benefit by replacing its assignment requirement with
Florida's third-party beneficiary theory.
The second portion of Indiana law that remains problematic occurs after ajudgment
creditor-via an assignment from an insured-gains the right to sue an insurer for its
bad faith. Indiana's law is unclear on what damages a judgment creditor may recover
from an insurer. Indiana courts developed the law governing assignments in Economy
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Collins'68 and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Axsom,'6 9 but certain
questions remain after the assignment.
In Collins, the Indiana Court of Appeals allowed a judgment creditor to bring an
action against an insurer because-unlike in Bennett-the judgment creditor first
received an assignment from the insured who was damaged by an excess judgment in
the underlying case. 70 In Collins, the insurer's failure to settle the underlying case
exposed its insured to an excess judgment.' 7' The court then allowed the insured (the
judgment debtor) to assign its claim for the amount of the excess judgment to the third
party (the judgment creditor).7 The assigned claim in Collins, though, involved only
the breach of contract action for damages in the amount of the excess judgment.7
The Court of Appeals then expanded upon Collins in Axsom. In Axsom, the Court
of Appeals allowed a judgment creditor, after receiving an assignment from the
insured, to bring an action against the insurer for pecuniary damages plus punitive
damages. The court defined pecuniary damages as the amount of the excess
judgment.7 5 The Axsom court did not address, however, whether ajudgment creditor
may pursue damages from an insurer other than the amount of the excess judgment
plus punitive damages.7 6 This unanswered question is the second lingering problem
in Indiana's insurance law that this Note will address. Part V.B argues that Indiana
assignment requirement creates problems in certain circumstances. See infra Part IV.A.
168. 643 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)
169. 696 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
170. See Collins, 643 N.E.2d at 384-86.
171. Id. at 383-84.
172. See id.; see also Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 484; Andrew P. Wirick & Ann Marie
Waidron Piscione, Survey of Tort Law Developments in 1994: The Good, the Bad and the
Ugly, 28 IND. L. REv. 1097, 1111 (1995).
173. Collins, 643 N.E.2d at 384-86; see also Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 484 n.l (construing
Collins as a breach of contract action rather than a tort action).
174. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 486. Although the court allowed the assignment of pecuniary
and punitie damages, the court expressly refused to decide "whether a tort action for an
insurer's bad faith failure to settle is assignable." Id. at 484 n. 1. Thus, the question of whether
a full bad faith tort claim is assignable remains unanswered in Indiana.
175. Id. at 485.
176. See id. at 484-86.
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could improve its insurance doctrine by resolving this question so that judgment
creditors gain the right to collect certain damages in addition to the excess judgment
and punitive damages.
V. SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS FOR INDIANA'S BAD FAITH TORT LAW
Because state regulation of the insurance industry offers little practical assistance
for insurance policyholders who have been wronged by an insurance company,'"
private litigation becomes an important check on the egregious conduct of insurance
companies." However, private litigants in Indiana, particularly judgment creditors,
currently lack certain important rights needed to hold insurers responsible for their
bad faith acts. 17 9 Part IV identified two problems that lurk in Indiana's insurance law:
(I) judgment creditors must obtain an assignment from an insured before suing an
insurer, and (2) after that assignment, the damages that a judgment creditor may
pursue are uncertain. This Part will address these problems by providing suggestions
for how Indiana courts could enhance the rights ofjudgment creditors.' In doing so,
sub-Part A suggests a procedural technique that would allow judgment creditors to
more easily bring a bad faith claim against an insurer; this technique would allow a
judgment creditor to bring the bad faith claim even when the judgment debtor is either
unable or unwilling to assign the claim to the judgment creditor. Then, sub-Part B
suggests a more substantive enhancement that would augment the damages that
judgment creditors may seek with a bad faith claim.
A. Eliminate the Assignment Requirement by
Adopting a Limited Direct Action Theory
Indiana law currently requires ajudgment creditor to receive an assignment before
pursuing an extracontractual claim against a tortfeasor's insurer.'8 ' This sub-Part
argues that Indiana courts could enhance the state's bad faith doctrine by eliminating
the assignment requirement, as was done in Florida. If Indiana were to eliminate its
assignment requirement, judgment creditors could more easily bring bad faith claims
against insurers, which would provide a means for private litigants to better hold
insurers responsible for their acts of bad faith.
Oftentimes, after an excess judgment, insureds will assign their right to a bad faith
177. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
179. See supra Part IV.
180. The fact that judgment creditors face restrictions in pursuing an excess judgment
claim against an insurer is a problem because, when an insurance company's bad faith acts
expose one of its policyholders to an excess judgment, the law should allow someone to hold
the insurer responsible for its inappropriate behavior. If not, the law fails to discourage
insurance companies from repeating wrongful acts. Sub-Parts A and B argue that, if Indiana
were to bestow more powerful rights on judgment creditors, then judgment creditors could
better act as the "someone" that holds insurers responsible for their inappropriate behavior.
181. See supra Part IV; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Axson, 696 N.E.2d 482,484-86 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1998); Bennett v. Slater, 289 N.E.2d 144, 147-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
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claim against the insurer over to the judgment creditor simply to resolve the excess
judgment debt owed to that party." Insureds sometimes make such an assignment
happily, in which case judgment creditors have no problems pursuing the bad faith
claim against the insurer." Assignments, however, are not always unproblematic.
After an excess judgment, tortfeasor insureds sometimes cannot legally assign any
rights to a bad faith claim to the judgment creditor. ' This can happen if the insurance
company has inserted a "nonassignment clause" into the insurance policy.'85 Or, for
various reasons, insureds may not wish to assign their right to the bad faith claim over
to the judgment creditor.'" For example, the insured's whereabouts might be
unknown.' 7 Or, the insured might be insolvent, in which case the insured likely would
never be forced to pay the excess judgment to the judgment creditor.' When such an
insured will never have to pay the excess judgment, she has no incentive to assign her
right to a bad faith claim to the judgment creditor in exchange for having the judgment
creditor release her from the excess judgment." 9 In this situation, the judgment
182. See supra Part IV.
183. See supra Part IV.
184. See generally Anderson & Gold, supra note 62, at 695-713.
185. When an insured must assign its rights to a third party, the door is opened for
insurance companies to assert the defenses to assignments. See id. The insurance company may
place a nonassignment clause in the contract in an attempt to rid the insured of any ability to
assign its rights to a third party. See id. Thus, an insurance company may slow or limit the
transfer of a right to a cause of action from an insured to a third party if thejurisdiction requires
a formal assignment of that right. See id. Courts do not necessarily honor these defenses. See
id.
186. See KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 497.
187. See Bennett v. Slater, 289 N.E.2d 144, 145 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972).
188. See KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 497. See generally Beets, supra note 105, at 345.
189. See KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 497; see also Beets, supra note 105, at 317 n.9, 345.
After an excess judgment, the insurance company usually pays its policy limits to the third
party. See, e.g., TOBIAS, supra note 4, at 116-17 (showing an example of how this happens in
a case). But, the judgment creditor holds an executory judgment over the insured for the
amount of the judgment in excess of policy limits. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying
text. Other than satisfying this executory judgment, the insured has very little incentive to
pursue any claims against the insurer. The damages an insured can collect from a potential bad
faith suit against her insurer based on the excess judgment in the underlying trial will be owed
to the third party to settle the judgment debt. See KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 497; see also
TOBIAS, supra note 4, at 116-17; Beets, supra note 105, at 317 n.9; supra notes 68-70 and
accompanying text. Therefore, insureds who owe ajudgment debt usually assign their right to
any bad faith claims against the insurer over to the judgment creditor as a settlement of the
judgment debt. See Beets, supra note 105, at 317 n.9; see also supra notes 68-70 and
accompanying text. This situation fails to take into account what happens when the insured is
insolvent and unwilling to assign the claim to the judgment creditor, see KIMBALL, supra note
4, at 497; see also Beets, supra note 105, at 345, or when the insured's whereabouts are
unknown, see Bennett, 289 N.E.2d at 145. This Note argues that Indiana courts should
automatically allow the rights to the bad faith claim to pass from the insured to the judgment
creditor. This is the problem that the Florida courts were addressing when they stated that the
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creditor is trapped. She cannot recover the excess judgment from an insolvent insured,
and, without an assignment, she cannot recover from the insurance company either.'"
The judgment creditor earned the right to the money in excess of the insured's policy
limits, but, without an assignment, the judgment creditor is impotent to enforce that
right. Moreover, the insurance company's bad faith conduct would remain
unpunished.
The judgment creditor, however, is the injured party that the law should seek to
protect in these situations. An insurer's wrongful acts should not go unpunished
merely due to complications in the assignment process. To remedy situations where
judgment creditors cannot obtain an assignment from the insured, Indiana should
adopt Florida's method of allowing a judgment creditor to bring the bad faith claim
directly against the insurer without an assignment.
Allowing a claimant to bring what is essentially an adverse party's right to a claim
without an assignment may seem like a radical notion for traditional tort law.' 91 But,
Florida's unorthodox method provides many benefits that, if adopted, would enhance
Indiana's bad faith doctrine. For example, because Florida judgment creditors may
bring direct actions against insurers, there is never a reason for a judgment creditor
to commence an action for the excess judgment against the insured, which could drive
the insured into bankruptcy.92 This provides an obvious benefit to insureds, and, in
turn, third parties benefit because they do not have to go uncompensated if the insured
is insolvent or unfindable' 93 Furthermore, judgment creditors in Florida may bring a
direct action only as the result of the underlying injury to the insured-just as with a
traditional assignment. 94 The insurer is burdened with no additional good faith duties
because the only duty the insurer owes is to its insured during the underlying case.
195
In other words, the insurer owes no duty of good faith to the third party.'Therefore,
purpose of allowing the judgment creditor to bring the bad faith claim against the insurer
without an assignment from the insured was "to remove the burden of the excess judgment
from the shoulders of the insured." McLeod v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 621,625 n.6 (Fla.
1992).
190. See KIMBALL, supra note 4, at 497; see also Beets, supra note 105, at 317 n.9, 345.
19 1. See MAGARICK, supra note 4, § 9.04, at 9-26 ("The great majority of decisions hold
that in the absence of an assignment from the insured.. ., an insurer owes no duty to a
judgment creditor in the original suit who, accordingly, may not bring a direct action against
the insurance company for a verdict in excess of the policy limits."); supra note 167.
192. Rice, supra note 19, at 346.
193. See id. at 346-47.
194. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Cope, 462 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 1985) ("The basis for an
action remain[s] the damages of an insured from the bad faith action of the insurer which
caused its insured to suffer ajudgment for damages above his policy limits.").
195. See supra Part III.C.4; see also McLeod v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 591 So. 2d 621,625 n.6
(Fla. 1992); Cope, 462 So. 2d at 460-61.
196. See supra Part III.C.4; see also McLeod, 591 So. 2d at 625 n.6; Cope, 462 So. 2d at
460-61.
Indiana courts refuse to allow ajudgment creditor to bring a direct claim against an insurer
by reasoning that, because third parties are strangers to the insurance contract, insurance
companies owe them no duty. Bennett v. Slater, 289 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972)
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Florida bestows additional rights and protections on third parties and insureds-while
(citing Robert F. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 1136, 1176 (1954)); see also Beets, supra note 105, at 329-30. Indiana courts are correct
that third parties are a stranger to the insurance contract (and insurance companies should owe
no duty to third-party claimants), see supra Part III.C.3, but insurers' duties do not change
when courts allow direct actions only after an excessjudgment. See supra Part III.C.4; see also
McLeod, 591 So. 2d at 625 n.6; Cope, 462 So. 2d at 460-61. If a state allows only a limited
direct action, like Florida, the insurer's duties before the excess judgment are exactly the same
as in states with an assignment requirement. See supra Part 1II.C.4; see also McLeod, 591 So.
2d at 625 n.6; Cope, 462 So. 2d at 460-61. Before an excess judgment occurs, an insurer in a
limited direct action state only owes a duty to handle its insured's case in good faith-the third
partyremains an adversary during the underlying case. Seesupra Part III.C.4; see also McLeod,
591 So. 2d at 625 n.6; Cope, 462 So. 2d at 460-61. Only after an insurer's breach of its duty
of good faith results in an excess judgment for its insured may a third party step into the shoes
of the insured and pursue a bad faith claim directly against the insurer. See supra Part III.C.4;
see also McLeod, 591 So. 2d at 625 n.6; Cope, 462 So. 2d at 460-61.
Indiana courts provide further support for the assignment requirement in excess liability
situations by reasoning that
[n]ot only is company without any duty to claimant to accept claimant's
reasonable settlement offer, but also, if there is a sizeable disparity between
the settlement offer and the amount ofthejudgment obtained in the trial which
follows refusal of the offer, claimant is benefited rather than harmed by
company's refusal to settle.
Bennett, 289 N.E.2d at 148 (quoting Keeton, supra). In circumstances in which the insured
readily assigns her rights stemming from the excessjudgment to the third party, this reasoning
may hold true. However, this reasoning fails to address the problems that develop when the
insured is insolvent or when the insured's whereabouts are unknown. Beets, supra note 105,
at 330; see also Bennett, 289 N.E.2d at 145. When the judgment creditor cannot obtain an
assignment from the insured, all that the judgment creditor may recover is the insured's policy
limits, which she likely demanded during settlement negotiations before the underlying suit.
See supra Part III.A; see also Beets, supra note 105, at 329. But, rather than settling for the
policy limits before trial, the insurer's bad faith forced the insured and the third party to endure
a trial. It is difficult to see how the judgment creditor is not harmed in this instance-the
judgment creditor collects the same amount of money that she demanded before trial, but she
had to endure a lengthy delay and a costly trial. Moreover, the third party is the injured party.
See Beets, supra note 105, at 345. Any bad faith delay by the insurance company
may cause the third party considerable economic loss. If the third party's
injuries are severe, the third party may be unable to work and may suffer a loss
of income. The loss of income, in turn may drive the third party into debt due
to his inability to pay his medical bills and support his family. As a result, the
third party may also suffer mental anguish.
Beets, supra note 105, at 345 (citations omitted). The Indiana courts' reasoning that the third
party "'is benefited rather than harmed by company's refusal to settle,"' Bennett, 289 N.E.2d
at 148 (quoting Keeton, supra), makes little sense when one considers the possibility that a
judgment creditor may not always be able to procure an assignment from the insured.
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an insurer's only duty remains its duty to its insureds.'9
Florida's "third-party beneficiary" (or "limited direct action") theory 9' is a safe
way to grant a third party an action against an insurer without violating the fiduciary
relationship between the insurer and the insured. Indiana should adopt Florida's
limited direct action theory and eliminate the current assignment requirement to
ensure that judgment creditors maylitigate bad faith claims against insurers. If Indiana
law were to grant these rights to judgment creditors, the law would provide a powerful
means for private litigants to hold insurers responsible for their bad faith acts. Holding
insurers esponsible for their bad faith acts may deter them from committing future
bad faith acts.'9
B. Expand Axsom to Allow Assignment of More Than an
Excess Judgment and Punitive Damages
Part V.A above demonstrated how Indiana courts could enhance the state's bad
faith doctrine by reforming the procedures that allow judgment creditors to pursue
claims against insurers. Indiana courts also could enhance the state's bad faith
doctrine by expanding the substance of the claim that judgment creditors may bring
against insurers. In short, Indiana courts should allow judgment creditors to pursue
claims for damages that include more thanjust the amount of the excess judgment plus
punitive damages. Indiana courts should allow judgment creditors to seek additional
damages to provide a better check on insurance companies' bad faith acts.
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Axsom2°° currently governs assignments from insureds to
judgment creditors in Indiana; the opinion declared what rights an insured may assign
after she is exposed to an excess judgment."' Axsom allows a judgment creditor to
receive an assignment for the insured's right to pursue pecuniary losses plus punitive
damages-which the judgment creditor may in turn pursue against the insurer."2
However, the Axsom court defined "pecuniary damages" as the amount of the excess
197. See supra Part III.C.4.
198. Florida, by naming its doctrine that allows a direct action by a judgment creditor
against an insurer a "third-party beneficiary" theory, see Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 250 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 1971), perhaps created some confusion for other courts that
faced litigants pressing for the adoption of Florida's doctrine in their jurisdiction. Other courts
have refused to adopt the third-party beneficiary theory by reasoning that the third party has
no privity of contract with the insurer, and thus, the third party has no right of action against
the insurer. Beets, supra note 105, at 329-30 (discussing the Indiana and North Dakota courts'
rejection of the third-party beneficiary doctrine). However, as this Note demonstrated above,
Florida's third-party beneficiary theory does not require an insurer to owe a duty of good faith
to a third party. See supra Part III.C.4; see also McLeod, 591 So. 2d at 625 n.6; Cope, 462 So.
2d at 460-61. Perhaps, therefore, Florida would be better served to call its doctrine a "limited
direct action" theoryrather than a "third-party beneficiary" theory. See Beets, supra note 105,
at 324-28 (employing the term "limited direct action").
199. See supra notes 1-4, 15-16 and accompanying text.
200. 696 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
201. Id. at 484-86.
202. Id.
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judgment. 3 Limiting assignments to the excess judgment plus punitive damages (and
nothing more) presents three major problems for the judgment creditor: (1) the
judgment creditor loses certain rights (that the insured would have had) due to the
assignment; (2) Indiana limits the amount of punitive damages any litigant may
recover; and (3) the limited amount of recovery creates a potential for conflicts of
interest between judgment creditors and their attorneys.
1. First Problem: Rights to Certain Damages
Dissolve Via the Assignment
Following an assignment, the judgment creditor cannot bring a claim that includes
all of the remedies that were available to the insured before the assignment. For
example, an insured that becomes exposed to an excess judgment in Indiana may sue
her insurer for all of the remedies accompanying the tort of bad faith-the full tort
permits the insured to sue not only for the amount of the excess judgment and punitive
damages but for consequential damages as well.2  The Axsom court mentions
damages such as mental distress, pain and suffering, embarrassment, mental anguish,
and humiliation as possible consequential damages that may result from an insurer's
bad faith.'0 Notably, all of the consequential damages mentioned in Axsom are
damages "personally suffered by the insured."2" A judgment creditor, however, may
not pursue these consequential damages because torts for personal injuries are
nonassignable.' 7
While it makes sense that a judgment creditor should not be permitted to pursue
someone else's personal tort claims,2~ limiting the judgment creditor's rights against
the insurer to only the amount of the excess judgment plus punitive damages excludes
other possible consequential damages that are not personal in nature-such as loss of
revenues,2' loss of profits, '210 loss of business opportunities, 21' interest on the
judgment,212 impairment of insured's credit,2 13 clouding of title of insured's estate,2 4
203. Id. at 485; see also Richard K. Shoultz, Survey ofRecent Developments in Insurance
Law, 32 IND. L. REV. 891, 897 (1999).
204. See Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 485; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 72, at 452,455-56,
469-70.
205. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 485 (quoting Clearwater v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 780
P.2d 423,427 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989)).
206. Id. Torts of a personal nature also include the torts of slander, assault, and negligent
personal injuries. MCCARTHY, supra note 72, at 456.
207. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 485.
208. Id. ("[F]ew legal principles are as well settled... as the rule that the common law
does not permit assignment of causes of action to recover for personal injuries.") (quoting
Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Ind. 1991)); see supra Part III.C.2.
209. Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Companies, Inc., 727 A.2d 1144, 1157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. MCCARTHY, supra note 72, at 472.
213. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 485 (citing Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collins, 643 N.E.2d 382,
385 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). The Collins decision first categorized impairing the insured's credit,
[Vol. 77:787
INDIANA 'S BAD FAITH INSURANCE DOCTRINE
and impairment of insured's ability to apply for loans."1 5 Because Axsom limited
assignments to the amount of the excess judgment plus punitive damages,36 Indiana
judgment creditors acquire the right to pursue fewer consequential
damages-including fewer consequential damages for injury to property-than the
insured originally held. This is a peculiar result given the logic that Axsom applied to
allow the assignment of excess judgments.
The Axsom court characterized excess judgments as injury to the insured's
property, and thus permitted their assignment.2 1 However, some consequential
damages also represent injury to the insured's property.2Is The Axsom decision did not
determine whether these consequential damages to the insured's property would be
assignable along with the excess judgment?"19 This is an area in which Indiana courts
could fortify the rights ofjudgment creditors without even modifying the existing law.
Indiana courts could categorize certain consequential damages resulting from an
insurer's bad faith as damages to the insured's property, and then declare these
damages assignable under the existing rules of Axsom.
Furthermore, the Axsom court's logic for permitting the assignment of punitive
damages provides additional support for permitting the assignment of consequential
damages to property. Punitive damages result from wrongs done personally to a
policyholder.' Axsom permitted the assignment of punitive damages, however,
because they are not intended to compensate personal injury.' Similarly,
consequential damages result when an insurer wrongs a policyholder, but
consequential damages to property also do not compensate personal injury.m They
compensate injury to property.'m Therefore, following the reasoning of Axsom, they
should be assignable.
One might argue that allowing a judgment creditor to pursue a claim for the
consequential damages to the insured's property would force the judgment creditor
into the awkward position of arguing for someone else's consequential damages at
trial. An attorney's argument that her client deserves money because the defendant's
clouding the title of an insured's exempt estate, and impairing the insured's ability to apply for
loans as "actual damages." Collins, 643 N.E.2d at 385.
214. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 485.
215. Id.
216.Id.
217. Id.
218. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
219. See Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 485 (citing Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Collins, 643 N.E.2d
382, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).
220. MCCARTHY, supra note 72, at 456 ("[P]unitive damages usually are allowed to the
insured in excess liability cases only when the insured has suffered a serious injury to his or
her person (such as, typically, mental distress resulting from apprehension of financial disaster).
221. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 485-86; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 72, at 517
("[P]unishment and deterrence . . .[are] the universally recognized rationale[s] for the
allowance of punitive damages.").
222. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
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wrongful settlement practices caused someone else (who may not even appear in the
courtroom) to lose profits seems odd. Viewed this way, consequential damages to the
insured's property seem rather personal. However, this argument is no more odd than
the attorney's argument that her client deserves punitive damages due to the egregious
manner that the defendant treated someone else. The law of assignments simply forces
assignees to further a fundamentally odd argument.
Indiana courts, however, do not focus on the arguments that litigants must make
after an assignment when determining whether a claim is assignable.' Indiana courts
only focus on the types of damages sought by assignees.' As long as assignees have
pursued damages other than damages for personal injuries, Indiana courts have
allowed the assignees to bring their claims.' Excess judgment claims pursue
pecuniary losses; thus Indiana courts allow their assignment. 7 Punitive damages
claims pursue losses designed to punish and deter rather than to compensate personal
injury; thus Indiana courts permit their assignment."' Consequential damages claims
based on emotional harm pursue losses for personal injuries; thus Indiana courts
prohibit their assignment. 9 Consequential damages claims based on monetary loss
caused by an insurer's bad faith pursue losses to property rather than losses for
personal injuries," and thus, Indiana courts should permit their assignment.
Furthermore, allowing assignments of consequential damages for injury to property
would follow the established guidelines of Axsom and promote Indiana's policy that
"the types of tort claims which may not be assigned have become so narrow that
nonassignability of tort actions is now the exception while assignability is the general
rule. ' 1
If, through an assignment, "the assignee acquires no more rights than were
possessed by the assignor,"" why must the assignee lose rights-including rights to
pursue damages for injury to property-that the insured could have pursued? This
presents a problem because the judgment creditor is the party that will most likely
pursue the bad faith claim against the insurer. 1 3 Ifjudgment creditors lose potential
damages claims through assignments, then judgment creditors cannot hold insurance
companies accountable for the entirety of their bad faith acts. If insurers know that the
full consequences of their acts of bad faith may never be recoverable by judgment
creditors, then they have less reason to avoid committing those bad faith acts in the
first place (against insureds). Bad faith actions sometimes serve as effective deterrents
against wrongful claims handling practices by insurance companies."' But, bad faith
causes of action lose teeth if rights vanish during the transfer to the party that most
224. See Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 484-86.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 485.
228. Id. at 485-86.
229. Id. at 485.
230. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
231. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 485.
232. Seamands, supra note 77, at 265.
233. See supra Part III.C.2.
234. See supra note 4.
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likely will assume the eventual role of plaintiff against the insurer.
To summarize the theory postulated in this section: Indiana courts should allow
assignment of the excess judgment, all consequential damages for injury to
property," and all punitive damages. The only nonassignable claims would then be
tort claims for personal injuries. 6 Furthermore, to incorporate the limited direct
action theory from Part V.A, the judgment creditor should no longer need an
assignment before initiating an action against the insurer. The judgment creditor
simply steps into the shoes of the insured?" and may pursue all of the insured's
possible claims, with the exception of tort claims for personal injuries. This theory
automatically releases the insured from any liability from the excess judgment."' The
235. The bad faith tort doctrine most commonly applies in automobile accident cases. See
Bopp, supra note 12, at 525. With an automobile accident, the insured will likely incur
consequential damages of a personal nature, such as emotional distress, pain and suffering, or
mental distress over the financial problems resulting from the accident. See Axsom, 696 N.E.2d
at 485; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 72, at 456. But in some liability insurance situations,
consequential damages to property can be very substantial. For example, in Birth Center. v. St.
Paul Companies, Inc., 727 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), the insurer represented a hospital
that was sued by a third party that brought a medical malpractice claim based on the events
surrounding the birth of their daughter. Id. at 1149. Before the trial of the underlying case, the
third party made repeated attempts to settle within the insured's policy limits. Id. at 1150-51.
The insurer refused all such attempts at settlement. Id. The case proceeded to trial and the jury
returned a verdict $3,317,743.34 in excess of the insured's policy limits. Id. at 1151.
After the excess judgment, the insured initiated a bad faith suit against the insurer. Id. The
insurer paid the amount of the excess judgment, id., and then claimed that this precluded the
insured from pursuing any claims for other consequential damages, id. at 1157. The court
disagreed, and allowed the insured to pursue a claim for consequential damages based on lost
revenues, lost profits, and "lost business opportunities in the form of a lost mortgage for
expansion of its facility." Id. The court upheld the jury's verdict of $700,000 for the
consequential damages alone. Id.
Under the theory suggested in Part V.B.I of this Note, the insured in Birth Center could
have assigned its claim over to the third party, because the insured's consequential damages
resulted from injury to its property. Furthermore, the theory suggested in Part V.A would allow
the judgment creditor to bring the claim without an assignment.
236. The insured need not necessarily lose her entire claim after she executes an
assignment. One California case demonstrated that "when an insured elects to assign the cause
of action for the excess judgment to the injured party, the insured may nonetheless reserve any
cause of action that he or she might bring for emotional distress as a result of the insurer's
failure to settle within policy limits." MCCARTHY, supra note 72, at 456-57 (citing Cain v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783 (Cal. Ct. App.1975)). The insured
accomplishes this by giving a partial assignment to the judgment creditor and then joining the
judgment creditor as parties plaintiff in a single suit against the insurer. Id. at 457.
237. See supra Part III.C.4.
238. See supra Part III.C.4. Additionally, this "automatic assignment" fulfills the
reasonable expectations ofthe insured. See Rice, supra note 19, at 344-45. The insured expects
her insurance policy to pay for any liability she incurs to third parties. Id. The insured does not
expect to be exposed to an excess judgment, especially since it bought liability insurance
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tort claim that results from the excess judgment simply accrues to the judgment
creditor-the actual injured party-rather than the insured."9 The result will be
enhanced rights for judgment creditors. These enhanced rights will additionally
provide a check on bad faith activities by insurers.
2. Second Problem: Indiana Limits Punitive Damages Awards
Indiana's method of limiting assignments to the amount ofthe excess judgment plus
punitive damages presents another problem: it severely limits the total dollar amount
that a judgment creditor may recover from an insurance company because Indiana
places a cap on the amount of punitive damages recoverable in any action. 4' Indiana
caps punitive damages at the greater of three times the compensatory damages award
or $50,000.24 The compensatory damages available to a judgment creditor under
current Indiana law consist only ofthe amount of the excessjudgment.242 The previous
sub-Part presented a theory to address this very problem-Indiana courts should
include consequential damages (to the insured's property) as part ofthe compensatory
damages available to the judgment creditor. That theory allows judgment creditors to
increase the amount of compensatory damages that they may pursue against insurers
so that, when tripled, the amount of punitive damages also may be greater.243
In 1995, Indiana enacted its version of a tort reform act.' The purpose of the Act
was to limit punitive damages, which the Indiana legislature viewed as excessive.24
The Act not only limited the total dollar amount of any judgment that a plaintiffcould
recover,2' it also limited the total dollar amount that a plaintiff could actually keep
specifically to prevent such a thing. Id.
239. Even with the "automatic assignment," the insured need not lose all of her claim
against the insurer. Indiana could write its "automatic assignment" doctrine so that, if the
insured wishes, she may join the judgment creditor in the suit against the insurerto pursue any
claims for consequential damages based on the insured's personal injuries. See supra note 236.
240. See IND. CODE §§ 34-51-3-1 to -6 (1998); see also Charles F.G. Parkinson, Note, A
Shift in the Windfall: An Analysis of Indiana's Punitive Damages Allocation Statute and The
Recovery ofAttorney's Fees Under the Particular Services Clause, 32 VAL U. L. REV. 923,
926 (1998).
241. IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4 (1998); see also Parkinson, supra note 240, at 926.
242. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
243. See supra Part V.B. 1.
244. See Parkinson, supra note 240, at 926, 951-55 (describing House Enrolled Act 1741,
specifically IND. CODE §§ 34-51-3-1 to -6 (1998)).
245. See id. at 951; see also Paltrow, supra note 2, at Al ("The [Indiana] insurance
industry spearheaded passage in 1995 of one of the toughest tort-reform laws in the nation,
sharply limiting punitive-damage awards and discouraging product-liability and negligence
lawsuits.').
246. The Act provides:
A punitive damage award may not be more than the greater of:
(]) three (3) times the amount of compensatory damages awarded in the action;
or
(2) fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).
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from that judgment.'4 Believing that plaintiffs received a windfall from punitive
damages awards, the Indiana legislature modified the punitive damages law by
requiring that seventy-five percent of any punitive damage award be paid to the
state.248 The plaintiff could only receive the remaining twenty-five percent.249 In 2002
the Indiana Court of Appeals nullified the section of the Act that required the seventy-
five percent/twenty-five percent split payout, ''0 but the total dollar amount cap
remains intact.
Upon the enactment of this statute, a problem arose for trial lawyers who litigate
bad faith claims against insurance companies. Because the statute caps punitive
damages in proportion to compensatory damages, the statute forced trial attorneys to
try to think of new tactics that would inflate the amount of compensatory damages in
the bad faith claim against the insurer so that, when multiplied by three, the cap on the
punitive damages may also be higher." Under current Indiana law, however,
attorneys representing judgment creditors may only pursue a fixed amount of
compensatory damages-Axsom set the amount of compensatory damages at the
amount of the excess judgment. 2 Thus, the statute affects judgment creditors in an
especially harsh manner.
This situation presents a fundamental unfairness for judgment creditors. The
purpose of punitive damages is to punish egregious acts and to prevent such acts from
IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4 (1998).
247. The Act provides:
(a)... [W]hen a judgment that includes a punitive damage award is
entered in a civil action, the party against whom the judgment was entered
shall pay the punitive damage award to the clerk of the court where the action
is pending.
(b) Upon receiving the payment descried in subpart (a), the clerk of the
court shall:
(1) pay the person to whom punitive damages were awarded twenty-five
percent (25%) of the punitive damage award; and
(2) pay the remaining seventy-five percent (75%) of the punitive damage
award to the treasurer of state, who shall deposit the funds into the violent
crime victims compensation fund ....
IND. CODE § 34-51-3-6 (1998) (ruled unconstitutional by Cheatham v. Pohle, 764 N.E.2d 272
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Cheatham, 764 N.E.2d 272; see also infra Part V.B.3.
251. See Parkinson, supra note 240, at 965-66.
252. See supra Part V.B. 1; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Azsom, 696 N.E.2d 482,485 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1998). Using the figures from the Axsom case as an example, the plaintiff received a
judgment of $80,500, or $30,500 above the insured's $50,000 policy limits. Axsom, 696
N.E.2d at 484. Indiana's punitive damages limiting statute interprets the plaintiff's
compensatory damages as the $30,500. IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4 (1998); see also Axsom, 696
N.E.2d at 484. Therefore, the limiting statute caps the plaintiff's potential punitive damages
award at $91,500. IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4 (1998); see also Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 484.
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recurring.2 In the third-party bad faith setting, the law should punish wrongdoing
insurers at a rate proportionate to the total amount of damage they cause. Insurers
incur their actual liability for punitive damages by dealing with their insureds in bad
faith. Any damages from an insurer's bad faith acts initially accrue to the insured, not
to the third party.2" With Indiana's limiting statute, litigants cannot punish insurers
at a rate based on a percentage of their total wealth." 5 So, wrongdoing insurers should
at least be punished at a rate proportionate to the total amount of damage they
cause-that is, the amount they initially cause for the insured. However, because
judgment creditors pursue excess liability claims more frequently than insureds,' the
punitive damages levied on insurers likely will not be determined as a proportion of
the insured's compensatory damages. Rather, punitive damages will be determined as
a proportion of the compensatory damages that a judgment creditor may bring after
an assignment. Compensatory damages drop to the mere- amount of the excess
judgment upon assignment from an insured to a judgment creditor under current
Indiana law.' The assignee, therefore, starts with a lower amount of compensatory
damages-lower compensatory damages in turn signify that the assignee will face a
lower cap on her potential punitive damages award.'
Why should the law punish wrongdoing insurers less severely after an assignment
than it could have before the assignment occurred? The assignment certainly makes
the insurers' wrongful acts no less egregious. Given thatjudgment creditors pursue the
eventual bad faith claims more regularly than insureds, current Indiana law often
cannot punish insurance companies for the total amount of damages they inflict. This
is the crux of the fairness problem-insurers can commit egregious acts without
receiving the full punishment for those acts.
Indiana could remedy this problem by eliminating the cap on punitive damages and
punishing wrongdoing insurance companies based on a percentage of their total
wealth. Because it is highly unlikely that Indiana will eliminate its punitive damages
cap anytime in the near future, this Note presented a theory in Parts V.A. (limited
direct-action theory) and V.B.1. (increased compensatory damages) that allows
judgment creditors to pursue a greater percentage of the damages that the insurer
actually inflicted upon the insured. This theory allows a larger amount of
compensatory damages to pass from the insured to the judgment creditor by way of
253. Parkinson, supra note 240, at 930.
254. See Axsom, 696 N.E. 2d at 485; see also McCARTHY, supra note 72, at 456.
255. See SHERNOFF, supra note 2, at 16. When statutes do not limit punitive damages
awards, the law often sets the amount of punitive damages based on the defendant's wealth. Id.
In ajurisdiction that utilizes no limiting statute, the following passage holds true:
The purpose of punitive damages is to punish and make examples out of
companies that engage in outrageous behavior. Ajury sets the amount ofpunitive
damages based on the amount of money it will take to make an errant company
change and start behaving more responsibly. The larger the company, the larger
the amount of punitive damages.
Id.
256. See supra Part III.C.2.
257. See supra Part V.B. 1; see also Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 485.
258. IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4 (1998).
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(automatic) assignment, which in turn allows the judgment creditor to pursue a greater
amount of punitive damages. Giving judgment creditors these enhanced rights to
pursue higher damages awards wouldprovide an effective check on egregious conduct
by insurers.
3. Third Problem: Conflicts of Interest Arise Between
Judgment Creditors and Their Attorneys
Indiana's method ofliniting assignments to the amount ofthe excess judgment plus
punitive damages also presents a potentially unethical incentive for the judgment
creditor's attorney handling the case." 9 After an assignment, Indiana's punitive
damages limiting statute-as it was enacted in 1995-mandated that a judgment
creditor could only claim twenty-five percent of any punitive damages award
recovered from a wrongdoing insurer.' The statute did not address, however, whether
the judgment creditor's attorney could claim part of her fee from the state's share of
the total award." In other words, the statute did not address whether the attorney
working on contingency could take her fee as a percentage of the total judgment, or
only as a percentage of the plaintiff's twenty-five percent share of the judgment.262
Due to these ambiguities, the Indiana Court of Appeals declared Indiana Code Section
34-51-3-6 (which mandated the seventy-five percent/twenty-five percent split payout,
but which did "not define from which portion an attorney's fees may be taken")263
unconstitutional in 2002.' 64
However, the Indiana Court of Appeals left room for the Indiana Legislature to
resurrect the statute in a slightly modified form. The court held that "since the statute
does not require the state to compensate the attorney for the prevailing party, it
requires attorneys who win a punitive damage award to perform particular services
without just compensation on demand from the State., 265 The court further ruled the
statute "void on its face as a matter of law to the extent that it requires attorneys to
259. See Parkinson, supra note 240, at 955-56, 965-66.
260. IND. CODE § 34-51-3-6 (1998) (ruled unconstitutional by Cheatham v. Pohle, 764
N.E.2d 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)); see also supra Part V.B.2.
261. Parkinson, supra note 240, at 955-56.
262. Id. Returning to the figures of the Axsom case as an example, see supra note 252,
Indiana's limiting statute caps the plaintiff's potential punitive damages award at $91,500. IND.
CODE § 34-51-3-4 (1998); see also Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 484. Then, under the former Indiana
Code Section 34-51-3-6, the plaintiff could keep only twenty-five percent of that award, or
$22,875. IND.CODE § 34-51-3-6 (1998) (ruled unconsitutional by Cheatham, 764N.E.2d 272);
see also Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 484. If the attorney then took a hypothetical thirty-three percent
fee, that potential fee would range from $29,865.00 to $7,548.75, depending on whether the
attorney took her fee as a percentage of the total judgment or as a percentage of the plaintiff's
twenty-five percent take ofthejudgment. IND.CODE § 34-51-3-6 (1998) (ruled unconstitutional
by Cheatham, 764 N.E.2d 272); see also Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 484; Parkinson, supra note
240, at 955-56.
263. Cheatham v. Pohle, 764 N.E.2d 272, 281 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
264. Id. at 281.
265. Id.
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perform, upon demand from the State, particular services without just
compensation." 2' Additionally, the court explicitly ruled that requiring the winning
client to turn over seventy-five percent of her punitive damages to the State was not
an illegal taking. 7
This holding leads one to believe that the statute could be reenacted if it were to
contain a provision that required the State to pay a percentage of the winning
attorney's fee (with her client paying the remainder). This way, the attorney would
receive compensation for the entirety of her services and the statute-according to the
reasoning of the Indiana Court of Appeals-would no longer offend the Indiana
Constitution." However, if the Indiana Legislature were to resurrect the statute so
that the winning attorney could take her fee from the totaljudgment (the compensatory
damages plus 100 percent of the punitive damages) but the winning client could only
receive compensatory damages plus twenty-five percent of the punitive damages, a
conflict of interests would arise between the attorney and her client.
If, under a resurrected form of the statute, the judgment creditor's attorney could
take her contingency fee from the total potential judgment (funded in part by the state
and in part by her client), then the statute would give incentives for attorneys to pursue
potentially large punitive damages awards at trial.269 A large punitive damages award
at trial would grant an attorney working on contingency a handsome fee. This statute
would provide further incentives for the attorney to proceed to trial because, if the
client elects to settle for the amount of the excess judgment, the attorney will receive
her fee only from the settlement money.27 Given that the attorney realizes that a trial
could produce a verdict of the amount of the excess judgment (the compensatory
damages) and punitive damages of three times the excess judgment (for a total of four
times the compensatory damages),27' the attorney will wish to continue to trial in
hopes of collecting her fee as a percentage of the total judgment.2 The client's best
interests, however, may not suggest proceeding to trial.
The client will realize that the resurrected statute would limit her potential recovery
to the compensatory damages plus a mere twenty-five percent ofanypunitive damages
award. " The insurer would likely readily offer to settle for the amount of the excess
judgment to avoid the punitive damages issue at trial. 74 The client will see the offer
("a bird in the hand") and will see that, even if her attorney were to win the full
266. Id.
267. Id. at 276-77.
268. Id. at 277-81.
269. See Parkinson, supra note 240, at 965-66.
270. See id.
271. IND. CODE § 34-51-3-6 (1998) (ruled unconstitutional by Cheatham, 764 N.E.2d
272).
272. The attorney may also harbor emotional reasons for wishing to pursue the punitive
damages claim against the insurer at trial, such as a disdain for insurance companies (a trait that
is not uncommon among plaintiffs' trial attorneys). See, e.g., SHERNOFF, supra note 2, at 17;
TOBIAS, supra note 4, at 102.
273. IND. CODE § 34-51-3-6 (1998) (ruled unconstitutional by Cheatham, 764 N.E.2d
272).
274. See Parkinson, supra note 240, at 965-66.
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amount of punitive damages, her total take-home amount would not even double with
a trial.2" Thus, the client would likely wish to settle.276
Therefore, Indiana's punitive damages limiting statute-if resurrected-could
exacerbate the problems caused by Indiana's method of limiting assignments to the
amount of the excess judgment plus punitive damages. Attorneys must protect the best
interests of their injured clients. However, their thoughts might be clouded by visions
of huge punitive damages awards. The very best thing that Indiana courts could do to
eliminate a conflict of interests between attorneys and their clients is to rule that
Indiana Code Section 34-51-3-6 is completely void, so that attorneys and their clients
share their winnings as a percentage of the same judgment amount.
However, if the statute were resurrected so that attorneys could receive their fees
as a percentage of the total punitive damages while their clients could only receive
twenty-five percent of the punitive damages, the theory posited in Parts V.A and
V.B.1 of this Note presents a method for alleviating the problems caused by this
conflict of interests. Perhaps if the law were to allowjudgment creditors to receive the
rights to greater compensatory damages from insureds, thenjudgment creditors would
experience greater incentives to pursue the correspondingly greater punitive damages
awards. More likely, though, this theory would help the judgment creditor settle for
a sum slightly larger than the mere amount of the excess judgment. The presence of
the extra compensatory damages provides the judgment creditor more leverage during
settlement proceedings with the insurance company. In either a trial or a settlement
proceeding, the enhanced rights enjoyed by the judgment creditor present a greater
likelihood that the judgment creditor will succeed at holding the insurer accountable
for its wrongful acts through a private cause of action.
This Part presented a theory designed to improve Indiana's bad faith law. The first
part of the theory would allow judgment creditors to enforce claims against insurers
275. Using the figures from Axsom again as examples, see supra note 252, the client
received the rights to pursue a claim for $30,500 in compensatory damages (the amount of the
excessjudgment) plus punitive damages. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d 482,484 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1998). Indiana's punitive damages limiting statute caps the punitive damages award
that the client could receive at three times the amount of compensatory damages (or $91,500),
of which the client would only collect twenty-five percent (or $22,875). IND. CODE §§ 34-51-3-
4, -6 (1998) (Section 6 ruled unconstitutional by Cheatham, 764 N.E.2d 272); see also Axsom,
696 N.E.2d at 484. Therefore, if the insurance company offered to settle for the amount of the
excess judgment, the client could immediately take $30,500. Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 484. The
client would see that, even if her trial were to result in a large punitive damages award, the
most she could collect would be $53,375-not even double the amount of the settlement offer.
IND. CODE §§ 34-51-3-4, -6 (1998) (Section 6 ruled unconstitutional by Cheatham, 764 N.E.2d
272);,see also Axsom, 696 N.E.2d at 484. Seeing this, the client would likely choose to settle
rather than endure the time and emotional expense of a trial.
276. The client may hold some emotional reasons of her own to settle. The client who
receives an assignment of an excess judgment just ended a grueling trial in the underlying suit.
The client likely will not wish to repeat that process. The client also commonly would have
bills to pay from the expenses that accumulated from the time of the accident until the court
entered judgment on the underlying suit.
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more easily.277 The second part, would then enhance the amount of damages that
judgment creditors could collect from insurers."' Both theories were forwarded under
the same premise and designed to achieve the same end: enhanced rights for civil
litigants that provide incentives for insurers to deal with their policyholders in good
faith. If Indiana were to adopt these two theories, civil litigants in the state would
enjoy litigation rights with stronger teeth, and insurers operating in the state would
face stronger incentives to deal with their policyholders in good faith.
VI. CONCLUSION
For insurance policyholders, often the most meaningful avenue for seeking redress
from the wrongful acts of a powerful insurance company is through civil litigation.
The most effective way that a state may regulate insurance companies operating within
its borders is to enhance the rights that private litigants may enforce against
insurers."7 9 Therefore, the rights that private litigants possess against insurance
companies assume paramount importance in a state's insurance law policies.
In Indiana, the law currently limits private litigants' rights by restricting the
compensatory and punitive damages recoverable by a judgment creditor after an
assignment. This Note presents a two-part theory that enhances the rights that
judgment creditors hold against insurers in Indiana. This theory allows judgment
creditors more easily to pursue bad faith claims against insurers, while also enhancing
the damages retrievable through such claims. Bestowing these rights upon judgment
creditors would help check egregious conduct by insurance companies operating in
Indiana. Insurance companies react to large losses incurred from bad faith suits, and
adjust their claims-handling practices accordingly.8 0 Enhancing the rights of private
litigants ensures that Indiana insurers will treat their policyholders more fairly.
277. See supra Part V.A.
278. See supra Part V.B.
279. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 4.
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